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Abstract 
When observing the prosocial acts of others, people tend to be very concerned with the 
reasons for act. A charitable donation motivated by concern for the charitable cause is 
seen as noble, while the same donation motivated by image enhancement is seen as 
disingenuous. In a series of six studies, participants consistently evaluated extrinsically 
motivated prosocial acts to be subjectively smaller and less impactful than the identical 
but intrinsically motivated act, and evaluated the extrinsically motivated actors less 
favorably than intrinsically motivated actors. These effects were robust across different 
prosocial domains and across different types of acts, including the donation of money and 
time and for conservation behaviors. These results demonstrate that motivation 
information causes people to violate strict adherence to principles of fungibility, using 
contextual information to evaluate equal fungible units differently. Two further studies 
establish that people will adjust their choices of products and resource allocation to 
punish extrinsically motivated actors and reward intrinsically motivated actors. The 
authors discuss these findings relative to formal principles of rationality, and propose an 
explanation of contextualized rationality. The implications of these findings for policy-
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Chapter One: Motives Matter, Even When They Don’t 
The last temptation is the greatest treason: 
To do the right deed for the wrong reason. 
-- T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral 
In his poetic drama, “Murder in the Cathedral,” T.S. Eliot provides a glimpse into 
the fictional musings of Archbishop Thomas Becket as he contemplates his imminent 
death and probable canonization with a sense of pride.  Uncomfortable with his prideful 
anticipation, he resolves that if he is to become a martyr, it must be for no reason other 
than the “rightness” of his dedication to God.  The moral plight of a 12th century cleric 
may seem a bit obscure, however we are faced with such dilemmas on a regular basis in 
guiding our own actions and motives and in judging the actions and motives of others.   
A more contemporary example illustrating the influence of motives on particular 
actions involves the market for hybrid cars.  In 2007, Toyota sold over 180,000 Prius 
Hybrid cars to people who we might assume wished to reduce their carbon emissions to 
benefit the environment and promote the greater good.  A New York Times poll 
indicated, however, that 57% of people who purchased the Toyota Prius in that year did 
so primarily because “it makes a statement about me” (Maynard, 2007).  The Prius has 
continually outsold all other hybrid vehicles largely, consumers report, because of its 
distinctive appearance that others recognize, leaving no doubt as to the owner’s 
environmental ethos and social contribution.  The Washington Post opines, “Prius politics 
are mostly about showing off, not about curbing green house gas emissions” (Samuelson, 
2007). This image-based motive has spawned derogatory references in popular media, 
with the phrase “pious Prius” returning over 95,000 hits when entered as a search term in 
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Google.  Somehow, when associated with a motive to enhance one’s image rather than to 
contribute to environmental protection, the act of buying a hybrid car loses its moral 
substance and is somehow diminished, much as Becket’s martyrdom might have been 
sullied by the indulgence of personal pride.  
Similarly, trends observed in media coverage of philanthropy illustrate typical 
responses to the complex motives that may underlie prosocial acts. In short, media trends 
indicate that good deeds are interesting, but good deeds that may have gone bad are 
irresistible to the news consuming public. Consider the 2010 donation of $100 million by 
Facebook founder Mark Zukerberg to schools in Newark, New Jersey.  The media 
coverage focused not on the impact of that large donation on a troubled school system, 
but rather on his motives for making the donation (Huessner, 2010).  Public opinion 
questioned whether this act was made out of genuine concern for the state of the New 
Jersey schools, or whether, in fact, Zukerberg’s donation was made in order to counteract 
unflattering publicity generated by a biographical film about him which opened in the 
week following his donation.  Speculation about his motives completely overshadowed 
attention paid to the value of his act, suggesting that people consider such motives to be 
relevant to their evaluation of a particular action.  
The Prius example and the public response to Zuckerberg’s donation have two 
particular features in common: a focus on an act that is prosocial in nature, and a 
questioning of the motivation underlying the act. In the current research, we evaluate the 
hypothesis that when an actor’s prosocial act is perceived to be extrinsically motivated 
(by some desired outcome that is separable from the prosocial outcome caused by the 
act), the act will be evaluated less favorably than an equivalent act that is intrinsically 
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motivated (by the value or enjoyment inherent in the prosocial outcome). This proposal 
gives rise to two specific hypotheses; the first hypothesis is that extrinsically motivated 
actors are evaluated less favorably than intrinsically motivated actors. The second 
hypothesis is that the relatively negative impression of the extrinsically motivated actor 
results in a corresponding negative evaluation of the prosocial act, relative to the same act 
performed by an intrinsically motivated actor.    
In support of these two hypotheses, we present existing theoretical foundations 
and evidence for proposed underlying patterns of association in the remainder of Chapter 
1, followed by a series of studies establishing new evidence for the two hypotheses in 
Chapters 2 through 4. Chapter 5 presents two further studies indicating that motivation 
influences choice behavior. A general discussion of the findings follows in Chapter 6.    
The Role of Motives in Evaluative Judgment 
Motivation is particularly important to evaluative judgment in the context of acts 
that are prosocial in nature, due in part to the utility of motivation information in 
predicting future behavior. Prosocial acts are defined as acts that benefit others, or society 
in general, often at a cost to the actor (Twenge et al, 2007). Though prosocial acts benefit 
others, such acts can be motivated by altruistic considerations or by self-interest, or both 
(Batson, 2003).  In social living situations, it has long been advantageous to be able to 
predict the prosocial or antisocial behaviors of others in order to manage one’s own 
wellbeing and maintain social equilibrium in situations of indirect reciprocity (Batson, 
2003, Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Motivation provides a basis for making such predictions.  
Attention to the motivation of others is fundamental to our understanding of 
others’ behavior. Once intentionality of an act is recognized, a person’s reasons for acting 
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are of primary concern (Malle & Holbrook, 2012). If a person performs a prosocial act to 
achieve extrinsically motivated outcomes, such as personal status or material rewards, it 
is reasonable to predict that when the interests of that person diverge from the interests of 
society as a whole, the person may cease to act prosocially and may in fact act 
antisocially in pursuit of those extrinsic goals. If a person performs a prosocial act based 
on intrinsic motivations, such as the betterment of society or the maintenance of social 
equilibrium, their future behavior is likely to continue to be aligned with the interests of 
society as a whole and thus is likely to continue to be prosocial in nature. Either of these 
conclusions has a logical place in determining how positively or negatively we evaluate 
the actor, how much we trust the actor, and the extent to which we desire further 
affiliation with the actor.   
When attending to the motives of others, people are suspicious of and negatively 
evaluate extrinsic motives (Fein & Hilton, 1994; Van Boven, 2010). As a species, we 
tend to be particularly sensitive to, and are highly skilled in discerning when someone in 
a social living situation is not fulfilling a normative social contract, such as reciprocity in 
resource allocation. We are able to identify and categorize a wide range of subtle forms 
of social cheating, from minor disingenuity and passive free-riding to active stealing and 
withholding of resources (Delton et al, 2012). At its most extreme, this ability is 
generally known as “cheater detection” (Cosmides, 1992,Delton, 2012). For example, 
people may perceive that a political candidate whose decision to run for office is 
motivated by increasing personal status may not always represent the interests of the 
people if the interests of the people diverge from the politician’s personal aspirations for 
status. The motives in this case may rationally influence the decision to affiliate with, and 
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therefore vote for, the political candidate or not. Often, extrinsic motivation is not 
cheating in the material sense, in that no resources are being misallocated or withheld. 
The extrinsic motivation may, however, be seen as manipulative and disingenuous, 
representing a misallocation of social capital by accepting praise or esteem for a good act 
that was performed for self interested outcomes. This misallocation of intangibles may 
arouse some of the same responses as the misallocation of tangible resources.  
The motives underlying a concrete prosocial act are often, but not always, 
orthogonal to the rationality of those actions. There are many situations, such as 
Zukerberg’s donation, in which motivation does not change the impact of the act, because 
prediction of future behavior is not the primary objective. In many cases, we are judging 
the impact of a discrete act that can be uncoupled from past or future behaviors by the 
actor, either because the act is unlikely to recur or because we have no immediate contact 
with the person such that our wellbeing could be affected by their future acts. In these 
discrete cases, the judgment of the actor and of the act should be separable. The act 
should, according to formal principles of rationality, be judged on its utility, in terms of 
the fungible units, e.g. number of dollars donated (Keys & Schwartz, 2009). One hundred 
million dollars has the same impact on the Newark school system whether Zukerberg was 
motivated by a desire to improve the school system or by a desire to improve his public 
image. Yet in these cases, motivations still enter and sometimes dominate the social 
discourse. The present research examines how people use this motivation information in 
evaluating the actor and the prosocial act.  
Prosocial actions activate global motive evaluations. We propose that when 
people observe others engaging in prosocial actions, they are prompted to construct a 
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global evaluation of the actor, composed of closely correlated judgments of perceived 
motivations of the actor and of likeability of the actor. There is evidence that people seek 
to reconcile traits and motives into a coherent dispositional evaluation of the actor 
(Reeder et al, 2004). We believe that the trigger for this integrative evaluation is the 
presence of an act that is open to interpretation and requires explanation. Person 
perception and attribution research has historically been concerned with a person taking 
action. Why might the presence of an intentional act call motives into question? Prior 
research suggests a number of reasons: an intentional act draws the attention of the 
observer, the act is often presented with alterative possible motivators, raising suspicion 
and requiring interpretation, and the act, once interpreted, provides information that is 
predictive of future behavior.  Malle and colleagues propose that observers tend to pay 
more attention to observable and intentional actions than to unobservable or unintentional 
acts (Malle & Pearce, 2001; Malle & Holbrook, 2012). The fact that a person chooses to 
take action attracts attention and causes observers to question why. Even the simplest 
intentional act can require interpretation when possible alternative reasons for the act are 
present. Fein and colleagues propose that the introduction of a feasible ulterior motive, 
prompted by some ambiguity in the reasons for the action, causes people to become 
suspicious and to actively consider the person’s motives relative to external factors when 
evaluating their action. For instance, in one study, participants read a speech given by a 
fictional person. In the constrained condition, participants were told that the person was 
instructed by a supervisor to adopt a particular position on the issue as part of his job. In 
the free choice condition, participants were told that the person was allowed to choose his 
position on the issue, and his supervisor shared that the position he chose to support in 
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the speech. Even with the choice constraint, people demonstrated the correspondence 
bias, judging the speech to reflect the speaker’s true views. In the free choice condition, 
the introduction of an extrinsic motivator that may have influenced the person’s choice 
was sufficient to cause people to judge that the argument in the speech did not reflect the 
speaker’s true beliefs and to actively consider the ulterior motive as an explanation for 
the action (Fein & Hilton, 1994).  
We propose that the presence of an observable, intentional act by a person results 
in greater coherence of liking and motivation variables, causing these two separate 
constructs to merge into a single construct related to the global evaluation of the actor. 
This is important for our hypotheses, and our chosen approach to exploring them in the 
current research, in that we focus on a relatively primary network of associations rather 
than any possible higher order sequential process, as the mechanism underlying the 
proposed effects of motivation on evaluation. 
The following pilot study provides preliminary evidence that the presence of an 
intentional act does indeed increase coherence of these variables as a single construct. A 
total of 143 people read a description of a person, either with or without a specific action 
taken by the person: 
In the No Act condition, the person was described neutrally, with general facts 
about the person’s life and no mention of any act: 
John is a 32-year old man who lives in Denver. He works in sales for a medium-
sized technology company, making a comfortable salary. He lives in an upscale 2-
bedroom apartment a few miles from his office. He has recently gone on a few 
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dates with a woman who lives in his building. John enjoys football and watches 
games at a local sports bar with friends from work.   
In the Act condition, the person was described exactly the same way, followed by 
additional information about an act performed by the person, with ambiguous information 
that could lead to questions about the person’s motives for the act: 
Recently John made a large donation to a charity. He learned about the charity 
from the woman he has been dating. Why do you think John would have done 
this? What motivated him to make the donation? Think about this as you answer 
the following questions. 
After reading the vignette, participants responded to a series of questions about 
the person, reporting their judgments of his likeability, admirability and trustworthiness 
(summarized as likeability), and the extent to which he was intrinsically motivated and 
extrinsically motivated (summarized as motivation).  Participants’ ratings of the three 
likeability variables were significantly correlated in both the no act condition and the act 
condition (average r = 0.56 and 0.59 respectively, see Table 1.1).  
 
Table 1.1
Pilot  Study: Act vs No Act
condition like admire trus t intrinsic extrins ic rev
No Act like 1 0.551** 0.577** 0.115 -0.136
admire 0.551** 1 0.557** 0.314* -0.104
trus t 0.577** 0.557** 1 0.154 0.061
intri nsic 0.115 0.314* 0.154 1 -0.043
extrev -0.136 -0.104 0.061 -0.043 1
Act like 1 0.582** 0.531** 0.423** -0.053
admire 0.582** 1 0.654** 0.498** 0.118
trus t 0.531** 0.654** 1 0.537** 0.117
intri nsic 0.423** 0.498** 0.537** 1 0.387**
extrev -0.053 0.118 0.117 0.387** 1
* significant at p<0.05




The intrinsic and extrinsic motivation variables were not correlated in the no act 
condition (r = 0.043), but with the introduction of an act, the two motivation variables 
were significantly correlated (r = 0.387).  Similarly, intrinsic motivation was not 
significantly correlated with the likeability variables in the no act condition (r = 0.19), but 
with the introduction of an act, intrinsic motivation was highly correlated with likeability 
(average r = 0.49). 
To test the hypothesis that introduction of an act will result in increased coherence 
of likeability and motivation as a single construct, we combined the five likeability and 
motivation variables into a scale and tested the Chronbach’s alpha by condition. The 
scale in the no act condition was less coherent as a single construct (Chronbach’s alpha = 
0.54) than in the act condition (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.74). This finding suggests that an 
initiating act can cause judgments of liking and motivation to organize into a single 
construct, suggesting that observers of the act may experience liking and motivation as 
closely related parts of the global evaluation of the person observed. Because of this 
correlation between motivation and liking, we predict that a manipulation that increases 
perceived intrinsic motivation should produce a correlated judgment of increased liking, 
and increased extrinsic motivation would produce a correlated judgment of decreased 
liking. Further, we predict that a manipulation of liking should result in similarly 
correlated judgments of perceived motivation. We seek to confirm this pattern of 
association between liking and motivation, and their joint effect on evaluation of 
prosocial acts, in the current research. First, however, we examine the second key 
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assumption of our research, that extrinsic motivation is a relatively less favorable 
construct than intrinsic motivation, resulting in less favorable evaluations of the person.   
Extrinsic motivation is a negative construct.  People observe in themselves and 
in others a negative association between extrinsic motives and desirable traits. The 
negative associations arise from correlations between extrinsic motivation and negative 
traits and from associations with negative experiences with extrinsic motivation. These 
associations cause people to make judgments about others based on their motivation.  
Existing findings reveal a strong correlation between extrinsic motivation and a 
variety of negative traits. For example, extrinsically motivated people have been found to 
be less loving in close relationships (Sheldon et al., 2004), and more selfish and self-
centered (Reeder et al, 2004; Kasser & Ryan, 2001). People who report being driven 
largely by extrinsic rewards also tend to score higher on a scale for Machiavellianism, 
characterized by high levels of cynicism and interpersonal manipulation, than people who 
report being driven largely by intrinsic rewards (McHoskey, 1999). To the extent that 
extrinsic motivation can be equated with materialism, as has been suggested by many 
researchers (Kasser & Ryan, 2004; Sheldon et al., 2004; Van Boven et al., 2010) 
materialistic tendencies have been shown to be associated with significantly less 
favorable traits (such as being trendy, self-centered, and insecure) than those associated 
with experiential tendencies (including being open-minded, intelligent, and outgoing).  
Further, there is evidence of a causal link between extrinsic motivation and evaluative 
judgments about the person. Additionally, people observing an actor with extrinsic 
motivations judge that actor as less likeable, desired less as a friend, and as possessing 
less desirable personality traits than a person who is seen to be acting based on intrinsic 
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motivations (Sheldon, et al, 2004; Kasser & Ryan, 1996, 2001). Work on affective 
responses to motivation tendencies showed that intrinsically motivated tasks are 
accompanied by reports of sustained higher levels of happiness, interest and surprise 
occurring before, during and after the task is performed, while extrinsically motivated 
tasks are accompanied by an increase in negative emotions during the task, and increased 
happiness upon completion of the task, indicating relief that the experience is over 
(Matsumoto & Saunders, 1988).  
What might be the source of these relatively negative associations with extrinsic 
motivation? There is evidence that people have affective experiences of their own 
motivations, which we believe they may apply to their perceptions of others’ motivations 
and associated traits. Overjustification provides an explanation for negative associations 
with extrinsic motivation. When reflecting on their own actions or observing others’ 
actions, people assume that an actor is acting based upon intrinsic motivation in the 
absence of any extrinsic motivator to provide justification for the act (Lepper, Greene & 
Nisbett, 1973).  The presence or introduction of any extrinsic motivator that appears 
sufficient to justify the act, however, is understood as more likely to be the motivator 
than the intrinsic value of the activity alone, and is said to overjustify the act. The 
introduction of extrinsic motivators has been shown to reduce the actor’s intrinsic 
motivation to engage in an activity, the actual time spent engaged in the activity, and her 
intentions to engage in the activity in the future (Deci, 1971; Lepper et al., 1973).  This 
effect is robust across a wide range of activities, from puzzle completion to writing 
newspaper headlines, and has been demonstrated in both children and adults (Lepper et 
al., 1973; Kunda & Schwartz, 1983, Pretty & Seligman, 1984).  
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Motivational crowding is another body of research that provides evidence that 
extrinsic motivation undermines intrinsic motivation, influencing our experience of the 
motivation act. Motivational crowding theory is based on the overjustification effect, 
relying similarly on self-determination theory for definitions, underlying mechanisms and 
organizing framework (Fehr & Gächter, 2002a; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). This body of 
research provides an economic perspective that also suggests that extrinsic motivators 
such as financial rewards and punishments crowd out intrinsic motivation, resulting in 
relatively more negative experiences and outcomes.  This crowding effect is important in 
that it runs contrary to the economic principle that increasing incentives increases the 
supply of the behavior being incentivized (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Fehr & Fishbacher, 
2002). The crowding effect is attributed to the process by which an extrinsic intervention 
reduces self-determination and/or self-esteem due to a shift in locus of control from the 
internal to the external.  The effect is illustrated in a number of contexts. In one study of 
prosocial acts, volunteers who were not offered any extrinsic reward worked for 
approximately four hours longer than volunteers who were paid for their efforts (Frey & 
Gotte, 1999). In the domain of common resources, compensation has been shown to 
create, not prevent, the tragedy of the commons by encouraging self-interested use of 
common resources to the detriment of the community. In a study examining the impact of 
regulation in Columbia to incentivize preservation of local forests, regulation-based 
compensation prompted an increase in destructive action by compensated actors 
(Cardenas, Stranlund & Willis, 1999). Related crowding out of intrinsic motivation to 
engage in prosocial acts has been demonstrated in domains of taxation compliance (Chan, 
Godby, Mestelman & Muller, 2002), reciprocal commercial relationships (Fehr & 
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Gachter, 2002) and operational performance (Austin & Gittel, 1999), among others.  
These findings extend overjustification to a broad set of economic contexts, and reinforce 
the idea that extrinsic motivators reduce intrinsic motivation and produce negative 
outcomes that may contribute to the negative valence associated with extrinsic motives.   
In related work, the introduction of an extrinsic motivator has been shown to 
produce negative affect that becomes associated with the experience of performing the 
act. In two studies, researchers demonstrated that extrinsic motivators induce negative 
schema such as bribery and “selling out”, and that the negative affect associated with 
these schema produce a reduction in intrinsic motivation (Pretty & Seligman, 1984).   
Finally, the correlations of extrinsic motivation with negative traits and 
experience have a causal effect on judgment of motivated others. Upon learning that a 
person makes materialistic choices (correlated with extrinsic motivation), people judge 
that actor to be significantly less likeable and as possessing less desirable traits than 
experiential-oriented people (correlated with intrinsic motivation) (Van Boven, et al, 
2010).  Mediation analysis indicates that the less favorable impressions arise from 
inferences that the materialistic person is less intrinsically motivated. Similarly, Fein 
(1996) showed that the introduction of suspicion of an ulterior (extrinsic) motive resulted 
in active consideration of affectively negative concepts such as dishonesty and 
discredited reputation, resulting in influence on judgments of motivated others.     
Evaluation of an Actor Affects Evaluation of the Prosocial Act   
We next examine evidence for the second hypothesis, which holds that people’s 
positive or negative evaluation of an actor, drawn from the actor’s perceived motives and 
likeability, influences their evaluation of a given prosocial act.  The influence of these 
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perceived motives drives people to form quite different opinions of the relative merit of 
identical acts, depending on the motives they attribute to the actor. This process of using 
information such as perceived motives to evaluate acts is particularly important in 
situations where people must form judgments based on inadequate or ambiguous 
information. We believe that this tendency can, however, be overextended into judgments 
about relatively unambiguous situations in which formal rules of rationality are generally 
considered the guiding principles.  
When we are faced with genuinely ambiguous information, we use related 
contextual information, which provides context and points of reference to interpret the 
information and assist in forming a meaningful judgment or preference (Asch, 1946; 
Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974; Kahnemann, Knetsch & Thaler, 1991).  Clearly, context is 
useful in many situations. Asch (1946) showed that a positively regarded trait, such as 
intelligence, can be made to seem more or less favorable when paired with other traits 
with valenced interpretations, such as “warm” and “cold.” In his classic study, 
impressions of a person described as “intelligent, skillful, industrious, warm, determined, 
practical, cautious” were significantly more positive than a person described in identical 
terms except for the substitution of “cold” in place of “warm.” Our reliance on contextual 
information can result in predictable influences on judgments, and arguably, over reliance 
can extend that influence into judgments that should not be influenced by context, 
according to formal principles of rationality.   
Just as motivation information is useful for predicting future behavior but not in 
evaluating the effect of a discrete act, contextual information is useful in situations 
involving subjective judgments, but it is less useful and should be relied upon less in 
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objective, unambiguous situations, such as those involving fixed amounts of money or 
time, for example.  Dollar amounts or amounts of time are concrete and normatively 
objective, and thus should be less influenced by contextual information.  This rational 
view of money, however, has been shown to fail in many circumstances. Rules governing 
the use of money represent an interesting class of contextual influences on decisions, 
particularly as the construct of money is simultaneously concrete and abstract (Belk, 
1996).  For example, one dollar is the same as every other dollar, able to buy exactly the 
same amount of goods, and is thus very concrete in its magnitude and meaning.  At the 
same time, money is highly symbolic, is valuable only due to consensual assignment of 
value within economic systems, and is of relative value (e.g. is $100 a lot or a little?). 
There is, therefore, a tension between the economic construct of money, as fungible and 
subject to transaction costs, and the psychological construct of money that is imbued with 
meaning derived from the social context and from exogenous factors that should not exert 
influence (Frisch, 1993; Keys & Schwartz, 2009).      
Emotional accounting is a phenomenon in which people routinely violate 
principles of fungibility and apply contextual information to distinguish between identical 
units. This occurs when money is given a valenced emotional tag based on the 
circumstances of its acquisition, later governing its acceptable use of the tagged money 
(Levav & McGraw, 2009). The source and circumstances of acquisition of money can 
contaminate the money with an affective tag such that people view it as sacred or 
profane, clean or dirty (Belk, 1996; Levav & McGraw, 2009). Money received under 
negative circumstances, such as the death of a family member, will more likely be spent 
on virtuous rather than hedonic purchases, effectively “laundering” the negative 
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emotional content of the money with the positive emotional content of the expenditure.  
Likewise, money can be affectively tagged by the circumstances of its acquisition 
(exemplary performance versus chance) (Loewenstein & Issacharoff, 1994), and by how 
the money is framed and described (Epley & Gneezy, 2005). Emotional content imbues 
the money in question with valence, and by extension, the purchasing behavior becomes 
valenced.  Emotional content can cause people to violate the principles of fungibility in 
cases of money, time and other fungible units (Kahneman et al., 1991; McGraw, Tetlock 
& Kristel, 2003). Each of these examples illustrates the tendency of people to manipulate 
normatively objective information by applying related, but not necessarily informative, 
contextual information.   
We have acknowledged that motivation information is useful in many situations, 
and is important enough to our survival that we develop high levels of sensitivity to 
motives that are deemed undesirable.  Why, however, might we routinely ignore 
fungibility and extend our reliance on motives to a class of judgments of objective 
information in which they are not directly informative?  Recall the furor over the motives 
underlying Zukerberg’s generous donation to a school district, as previously described. 
The value and impact of that donation is completely separable from his motives, but the 
public debate clearly demonstrated its perceived relevance to the public understanding of 
that prosocial act. Our judgments are routinely influenced by factors that should not 
influence them; these influences are often unwanted and usually uncontrollable (Wilson 
& Brekke, 1994; Wilson, Centerbar & Brekke, 2002). The evidence that people use of 
motives when not relevant to the judgment represents an overextension of the 
informational value of motives. This is one of several questions we consider as we 
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develop and understanding of how people use motivation information to judge actor and 
act in the current research.   
We tested in six studies the hypotheses that extrinsically motivated actors are 
evaluated less favorably than intrinsically motivated actors and that the relatively 
negative impression of the extrinsically motivated actor results in a corresponding 
negative evaluation of the prosocial act, relative to the same act performed by an 
intrinsically motivated actor.   In Chapter Two, the first two studies examined the effect 
of extrinsic vs. intrinsic motivation on evaluative judgments of monetary donations 
(Study 1) and donations of time (Study 2) to humanitarian causes. In Chapter 3, we then 
tested whether motivation information would produce the same pattern of evaluation for 
monetary donations (Study 3) and a “green” purchase (Study 4) in the more controversial 
prosocial domain of environmental conservation. In Chapter 4, we explored the 
underlying mechanism, first testing whether the manipulation of likeability of the 
prosocial actor resulted in corresponding changes in judgment of the actor’s motivation 
and the evaluation of the prosocial act (Study 5), and then examining motivation 
inferences in the absence of motivation information, using a free vs. forced choice 
paradigm (Study 6). Additionally, we explored the boundaries of the motivation effect by 
manipulating the objective size of the prosocial act (Study 7). Finally, in Chapter 5, we 
tested whether participants would alter their product choice behavior (Study 8) and their 
resource allocation behavior (Study 9) to punish extrinsic motivation and/or reward 
intrinsic motivation in response to motivation information.  In Chapter 6, we discuss the 
findings of these studies relative to formal principles of rationality, and propose an 
explanation of contextualized rationality. The studies we have conducted extend the 
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theoretical understanding of motivation on judgment by establishing a causal relationship 
between motives and evaluative judgments of the actor and the act, where previously 
only correlational evidence was available.  Additionally, the studies explore the 
application of motivation theory to practical choices and decisions that occur in daily life, 
as well as important policy and program questions. Thus, a range of implications of these 
findings for policy-making and implementation are discussed.  
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Chapter Two: Motivation in Evaluation of Humanitarian Acts 
Perhaps the simplest, most straightforward prosocial act is the donation of one’s 
money to a worthy cause. The money, once donated, is generally unfettered by the 
donor’s influence and can be spent for greatest impact by the recipient charitable 
organization. From a rational perspective, the dollars should be judged consistently, 
without reference to the person who made the donation. The benefit to the given charity 
does not vary based on the source or the motivation of that source (Keys & Schwartz, 
2009; Fehr & Gächter, 2009). We know, however, that this rational perspective does not 
always prevail. Instead, dollars can be accounted for and spent differently based on their 
source and the circumstances of their acquisition (Levav & McGraw, 2010). We explore 
in the first two studies whether the evaluation of the person performing the prosocial act 
can cause differences in evaluation of fungible units (dollars and time). These studies 
compare judgments of an extrinsically motivated act relative to intrinsic motivation and a 
control condition in which no motive information is provided. This comparison reflects 
our expectation that the negatively valenced extrinsic motivation will exert a stronger 
influence on evaluation than the intrinsic and control conditions, consistent with the 
negativity bias (Baumeister et al,). The studies also compare intrinsic motivation to the 
control condition with the expectation that explicit intrinsic motivation may exert a 
positive influence of evaluation of the act, but the effect is likely to be weaker due to the 
positive valence and the tendency of people to infer intrinsic motives in the absence of 
extrinsic motivators.    
Study 1: Humanitarian Donation 
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For our initial exploration of evaluative judgments of prosocial acts, we selected a 
prototypical charitable act that tends to be generally accepted as a worthy cause without 
any obvious political or religious implications – that of helping disadvantaged children. 
The first study involves a humanitarian donation focused on improving the health of 
impoverished African children. This type of prosocial act taps into a number of cultural 
frameworks encouraging people to help other people in need. Participants were asked to 
read a vignette about a donation of money to a charity, including information about the 
actor’s intrinsic or extrinsic motives for making the donation. After reading the vignette, 
participants responded to a series of questions about the actor and about the charitable 
donation. We predicted that participants who read about an extrinsically motivated actor 
would judge the actor to be less likable and the donation to be less impactful and smaller 
than those who read about an intrinsically motivated actor who made the identical 
donation.  
Method. Members of the public (N = 95) participated in the study on the internet 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid compensation of $0.50. The average 
age of participants was 33 (SD=12.7), and the sample was 55% female, 44% male, with 
1% unreported. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of three vignettes about 
a person, Joe, who made a $100 donation to a fictional charity called Malaria Action.  
The three conditions were operationalized as follows:  
In the intrinsic condition, Joe was moved to act by the plight of children with malaria: 
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office and also 
serves as a volunteer for a charity called Malaria Action. Jessica describes the 
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effects of malaria in Africa and explains how her charity raises money to buy 
mosquito nets to protect African children.  Joe is moved by the plight of African 
children and wants to help prevent malaria. He cares deeply about helping 
disadvantaged people. He donates $100 to Malaria Action. 
In the extrinsic condition, Joe wanted to impress the woman who asked for the donation: 
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office and also 
serves as a volunteer for a charity called Malaria Action. Jessica describes the 
effects of malaria in Africa and explains how her charity raises money to buy 
mosquito nets to protect African children.  Joe is attracted to Jessica and would 
like to ask her out to dinner. He wants to impress her, so he praises her volunteer 
work and donates $100 to Malaria Action. 
 In the control condition, no information on motives was provided in the vignette:  
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office and also 
serves as a volunteer for a charity called Malaria Action. Jessica describes the 
effects of malaria in Africa and explains how her charity raises money to buy 
mosquito nets to protect African children.  Joe donates $100 to Malaria Action. 
The manipulation was designed to ensure that the extrinsically motivated donation 
remained essentially a beneficial act, and that the extrinsic motivator for the act, even if 
somewhat disingenuous, was essentially harmless and not overtly negative. After reading 
the vignette, participants were asked to write about Joe’s motivations for making the 
donation. Following the writing task, they were asked to judge how large Joe’s donation 
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was and how much good it would do to combat malaria, measured on a 7-point scale (1 = 
Virtually No Impact, 7 = Very Large Impact).  They were also asked to judge how 
admirable and likeable Joe is, also on a 7-point scale (1 = Not At All Likeable, 7 = 
Extremely Likeable). Judgments of the act and the actor were counterbalanced. They 
finally judged the extent to which the actor was intrinsically motivated to perform the 
prosocial act, on a 7-point scale (1 = Not At All Intrinsically Motivated, 7 = Completely 
Intrinsically Motivated), followed by a similar judgment regarding extrinsic motivation, 
which in combination provide a manipulation check. Upon completion of the 
questionnaire, the participants were thanked and debriefed. 
 Participants’ ratings of variables relating to the donation (size of donation and 
how much good it will do) were averaged to form a single measure labeled act evaluation 
(r = 0.429).  The ratings of variables relating to judgments of the actor (like, admire and 
trust) were averaged to form a single measure labeled actor evaluation (Chronbach’s 
alpha = 0.90). A new variable called perceived motivation was calculated by subtracting 
the judgment of extrinsic motivation from the judgment of intrinsic motivation, such that 
positive values of perceived motivation indicate greater intrinsic motivation and negative 
values indicate greater extrinsic motivation (r = -0.823). The variables relating to 
likeability of the actor and those relating to the perceived motivation of the actor are, we 
propose, closely associated parts of the global evaluation of the actor, and according to 
our assumption and associated pilot study discussed in Chapter 1, should cohere as a 
single construct when evaluated in response to a motivated act. To test this assumption, 
we conducted a scale reliability analysis of the five variables: liking, admirability, 
trustworthiness, intrinsic motivation and a reverse-scored extrinsic motivation.  The scale 
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reliability analysis for these five variables returned a Chronbach’s alpha of .927, 
indicating a high degree of coherence. The alpha did not vary by condition in this study 
or subsequent studies, so it is not reported separately by condition.  
We selected a set of planned contrast codes to compare the extrinsic condition to 
the intrinsic and control then to compare intrinsic motivation with the control condition. 
This set of comparisons was selected specifically because we expected negative motives 
to have a stronger effect than intrinsic motives on the judgment and that judgments in the 
intrinsic and control conditions will tend to be similar. This expectation is based on work 
in overjustification, which has shown that in the absence of an extrinsic motivator, people 
assume the act is intrinsically motivated. This suggests that in the control condition, when 
no motivation information is provided, people will infer intrinsic motives and the 
judgments in the control condition will be similar to judgments in the intrinsic condition. 
We also draw upon established evidence that bad is stronger than good, as is 
demonstrated in the negativity bias (Baumeister et al, 2001). Further, we expect people to 
assume in the control condition with no motive information that the act was intrinsically 
motivated. 
Results. We conducted a manipulation check followed by a series of primary 
analyses examining the planned contrasts between motivation conditions.  
Manipulation check. In the extrinsic condition, the mean perceived motivation 
Table 2.1a
Study 1: Humanitarian Monetary Donation 
Judgment n M SD n M SD n M SD
Motivation
a 33 -3.67 1.76 33 0.24 2.91 29 3.10 2.09
Liking 33 3.34 1.12 33 4.55 1.22 29 5.57 1.07
Act Evaluation 33 4.25 0.83 33 4.52 1.09 29 5.09 1.18
a
Motivation serves as a manipulation check in this study
Extrinsic Control Intrinsic
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was -3.67 (SD = 1.76), indicating greater extrinsic motivation. In the intrinsic condition, 
the mean perceived motivation was 3.10 (SD = 2.09), indicating greater intrinsic 
motivation, and in the control condition, the mean was 0.24 (SD = 2.91), indicating 
roughly equal intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The mean differences of the perceived 
motivation judgments were significant (F(2,92) = 67.25, p <0.0001) (See Table 2.1a).  
 
With the planned set of contrast codes, we confirmed that the mean of the 
extrinsic condition was significantly lower than intrinsic and control as expected (t (92) = 
-10.71, p<0.001) and the means of intrinsic and control were significantly different from 
each other (t (92) = 4.86, p<0.001) (See Table 2.1b).  
 
Primary analyses. The mean evaluation of the prosocial act varied by condition. In the 
extrinsic condition, the mean evaluation was 4.25 (SD = 0.83).  In the intrinsic condition, 
the mean act evaluation was 5.09 (SD = 1.19), and in the control condition, the mean was 
4.52 (SD = 1.09). The mean differences of the act evaluation judgments were significant 
(F(2,92) =  5.19, p = 0.007). With the contrast codes, we confirmed that the mean of the 
extrinsic condition was significantly lower than intrinsic and control as expected (t (92) = 
-10.71, p<0.001) and the means of intrinsic and control were significantly different from 
each other (t (92) = 4.86, p<0.001).  
Table 2.1b
Judgment t p t p
Motivation -10.71 0.00 4.86 0.00
Liking -6.98 0.00 3.54 0.00
Act Evaluation -2.46 0.02 2.18 0.03
Contrast (EvsIC) Contrast (IvsC)
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Likewise, the actor was judged to be less likable when he was extrinsically 
motivated (M = 3.34, SD = 1.12) than when he was intrinsically motivated (M = 5.58, SD 
= 1.07), or when no motivation information was provided (M = 4.55, SD = 1.22), and the 
mean differences were significant (F (2,94) = 29.71, p < 0.0001). The planned contrasts 
allowed us to establish that the mean evaluation of the act performed by the extrinsically 
motivated actor was significantly lower than the evaluation of the act performed by the 
intrinsically motivated actor and the actor with no motivational information (t (92) = -
2.46, p = 0.02). Further, the evaluation of the act by the intrinsically motivated actor was 
significantly higher than that of the control condition (t (92) = 2.18, p = 0.03). There was 
a significant positive partial correlation between actor evaluation and act evaluation after 
controlling for motivation condition (r (92)= 0.586). This strong relationship when 
controlling for motive condition supports our contention that evaluations of the act and 
actor are closely associated constructs that we predict will respond similarly to a motive 
manipulation. The order of evaluation of actor and act had no significant effect on any 
results and was not analyzed further. 
These results support the hypothesis that extrinsic motivation produces the change 
in judgment relative to intrinsic motivation and control, reducing liking of the actor 
relative to liking in the intrinsic and control conditions and reducing the favorability of 
evaluation of the prosocial act.   
Discussion. This study was designed to provide initial evidence of the effect of 
motivation information on evaluations of the actor and the act. In the context of a highly 
evaluable donation of a set amount of money, it might have been reasonable to see no 
difference in the evaluation of the donation.   All dollars have equivalent power to 
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achieve a desired outcome in support of a particular charitable cause.  However, 
depending on the motive underlying the donation, the evaluations are significantly 
different. Extrinsic motivation reduces the likeability of the actor, consistent with the halo 
effect (Asch, 1946) and the negative associations explored in Chapter 1.  As predicted, 
extrinsic motivation also appears to contaminate the donated dollars, reducing their 
expected impact and subjective size, relative to intrinsically motivated donations and to 
donations with no motivation information. This finding suggests that motivation 
information produces a systematic influence on people’s evaluation of a prosocial act, 
and further, that people appear to be derogating extrinsic motivation rather than 
rewarding intrinsic motivation in their judgments. Motivation influences judgments even 
though the motivation information is arguably not relevant to the rational evaluation of a 
donation of a fixed amount of money.   
Study 2: Humanitarian Donation of Time 
Motivation had the predicted effect in the case of monetary donations. We 
designed the second study to examine whether this effect extends to non-monetary 
donations such as personal time that are arguably more concrete than money. The amount 
of work done by the volunteer was held constant to mitigate the possibility that one 
volunteer might be more productive than another. 
Participants were asked to read a vignette about a donation of a specific number 
of volunteer hours to a charity, during which the volunteer performed a fixed amount of 
work that was held constant across conditions. The vignette included information about 
the actor’s intrinsic or extrinsic motives for volunteering. After reading the vignette, 
participants responded to a series of questions about the actor and about the volunteer’s 
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donated time. I predicted that participants who read about an extrinsically motivated actor 
would judge the actor to be less likable and the donation of time to be less impactful and 
smaller than those who read about an intrinsically motivated actor who volunteered for 
the identical amount of time.   
Method. Students in the Psychology Department (N = 100) participated in the 
study through the student subject pool, in exchange for partial course credit. The sample 
was 67% female and 33% male. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of two 
vignettes about a person, Dan, who volunteered for 6 hours per week, packing snack 
packs for underprivileged children in a fictional after-school program.  The two vignettes 
read as follows:  
Intrinsic 
Dan is a senior at a University in the West. He is a fulltime student with a job at a 
local coffee shop. One day Dan sees an ad on campus looking for volunteers to 
prepare snack packs at an after-school program an elementary school in a poor 
neighborhood. The after-school program offers children a safe and fun 
environment with structured activities in the underserved community. Dan had 
spare time and was looking for a way to give back to the community. Dan knew 
that many of the children don’t have people to look up to and he desperately 
wanted to make a positive impact in any possible way. Dan was moved to act 
because the program would allow him to devote himself toward helping the 
children in the community. Dan worked two days a week for a total of 6 hours, 
putting together the 100 snack packs. The snack packs were assembled from 
individually pre-packaged crackers, fruits, and vegetables. 
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Extrinsic 
Dan is a senior at a University in the West. He is a fulltime student with a job at a 
local coffee shop. One day Dan sees an ad on campus looking for volunteers to 
help prepare snack packs at an after-school program an elementary school in a 
poor neighborhood. The after-school program offers children a safe and fun 
environment with structured activities in the underserved community. Dan was 
going to start looking for a job after graduation and knew that employers like to 
see job candidates with volunteer experience. Dan really doesn’t like children and 
has always felt awkward around them. Dan had looked into other programs where 
he could volunteer, but the after-school program was the only place that was 
currently hiring. By volunteering for the program, Dan knew he could put on his 
resume that he volunteered to help underprivileged children. Dan worked two 
days a week for a total of 6 hours, putting together the 100 snack packs. The 
snack packs were assembled from individually pre-packaged crackers, fruits, and 
vegetables. 
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to judge how large Dan’s 
volunteer time was and how much good it would do to help underprivileged children, 
measured on a 7-point scale.  They were also asked to judge how admirable and likeable 
Dan is, also on a 7-point scale. Judgments of the act and the actor were counterbalanced.   
Upon completion of the questionnaire, the participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Participants’ ratings of variables relating to the donation (size and impact) were 
averaged to form a single measure labeled act evaluation (r = 0.43).  The ratings of 
variables relating to judgments of the actor (like and admire) were averaged to form a 
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single measure labeled actor evaluation (r = 0.57). Perceived motivation was not 
measured in this study, so there is no manipulation check reported, and no scale 
reliability analysis was conducted for the combined actor evaluation variables. 
Results. The evaluation of the act was judged significantly less favorably when 
the actor was extrinsically motivated (M = 3.73, SD = 1.02) than when he was 
intrinsically motivated (M = 4.47, SD = 0.86), (t (99) = 3.90, p < 0.0001).  Likewise, the 
actor was judged to be far less likable when he was extrinsically motivated (M = 2.76, SD 
= 1.29) than when he was intrinsically motivated (M = 5.50, SD = 1.09), (t (99) = 11.478, 
p < 0.0001) (see Table 2.2). There was a significant positive correlation between actor 
evaluation and act evaluation after controlling for motivation condition (r (97)= 0.391).  
 
 
These results confirm the findings of Study 1, replicating the pattern of influence on 
judgments of monetary donations, extending the evidence to include judgments of 
donations of time.  
Discussion. These results suggest that the effect of motivation on evaluation of 
prosocial acts is not restricted to the economic domain. While time itself is fungible, 
arguably effort within a period of time by differently motivated people could be entirely 
non-fungible. The obvious assumption would be for the intrinsically motivated volunteer 
Table 2.2
Study 2: Humanitarian Time Donation 
Judgment n M SD n M SD t p
Liking 50 2.76 1.29 50 5.50 1.09 11.49 <0.0001
Act Evaluation 50 3.73 1.02 50 4.47 0.86 3.90 <0.01
Extrinsic Intrinsic Mean Difference
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to do a better job than the extrinsically motivated volunteer within the 6 hours. There are 
many cases, however, when the passionate volunteer is not competent and can do more 
harm than good, while the paid contractor is highly skilled and delivers the higher quality 
output in the time. For this reason, we presented a very concrete description of the task 
(place 7 items in a paper bag, complete 100 bags over the course of the 6 hours), 
accompanied by a photograph of the items. We believe that increasing the subjectivity of 
the volunteer effort would likely exacerbate the effect of extrinsic motivation on 
evaluation of the volunteer and the time spent working for the charity.  
We have shown that for both monetary and time donations, extrinsic motivation 
reduces liking of the actor relative to liking in the intrinsic condition, and extrinsic 
motivation also reduces the favorability of evaluation of the prosocial act relative to the 
evaluation of the act performed by the intrinsically motivated actor in the humanitarian 
realm. We consider now how far this effect extends beyond helping disadvantaged 
children.     
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Chapter Three: Motivation in Evaluation of Environmental Prosociality 
It is possible that there is something particular about the specific act of helping 
needy children that produces the effects we have seen thus far. People may view a 
donation to sick children that is based on a desire for personal gain as a particularly 
distasteful type of cheating, and helping out of genuine concern to be particularly noble, 
likely due to the many cultural frameworks that emphasize the importance of selfless 
giving and helping others. In order to establish whether these results can be generalized 
to prosocial acts more broadly, we extended the investigation to other categories of 
prosocial acts.  The Environmental Donation Study, described below, provides this 
broader context, using the same donation paradigm applied to a more controversial cause 
involving environmental protection. 
Study 3: Environmental Donation 
There is considerable controversy associated with environmental issues, and 
radically different views exist pertaining to issues such as the magnitude of 
environmental damage, the source of that damage, and the consequences involved 
(Global Warming Seen as a Problem, 2009). For example, perspectives on the existence 
of global warming vary widely by age group, religiosity and political orientation. 
Similarly, controversy exists over the extent to which the interests of non-human species 
should constrain the development of human societies.  Views on this topic range from 
fully human-centric (dominionist) perspectives, in which natural resources are present 
solely in service of man’s needs, to the perspectives of extreme activists who are willing 
to use deadly force to protect endangered species (Sideris, 2003). As early as the 1960s, 
environmental scholars were blaming developing environmental damage on a 
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dominionist approach to natural resources policy and practice (White, 1967). The 
environmental domain was chosen for this study precisely because this type of prosocial 
act is more controversial than humanitarian acts. It is possible that the moral ambiguity of 
acts of environmental conservation could make extrinsic motives more acceptable, 
reducing or eliminating the effect of motivation on the evaluation of the act. The 
Environmental Donation Study is designed to test the robustness of our predicted effect 
in the context of these ambiguities. Donation of money to buy seedlings for reforestation 
was chosen as the prosocial act, holding dollars constant and varying motivation for the 
act using the manipulation from Study 1. 
Method. Members of the public (N = 96) participated in the study on the internet 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk for compensation of $0.50. The average age of 
participants was 31 (SD = 9.37), and the sample was 55% female, 44% male and 1% 
unreported. Participants were randomly assigned to read one of three vignettes about a 
person, Joe, who made a $100 donation to a fictional charity called the New Forest Trust.  
The three conditions presented the actor with different motives for the donation, using the 
same design as the first humanitarian donation study. The vignettes read as follows: 
Intrinsic 
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office and also 
serves as a volunteer for a charity called the New Forest Trust. Jessica describes 
the effects of deforestation on old growth forests and explains how her charity 
raises money to plant tree seedlings to renew forested ecosystems. Joe is moved 
by the effects of deforestation on the environment and wants to help repair the 
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damage. He cares deeply about preserving the natural environment. He donates 
$100 to the New Forest Trust. 
Extrinsic 
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office and also 
serves as a volunteer for a charity called the New Forest Trust. Jessica describes 
the effects of deforestation on old growth forests and explains how her charity 
raises money to plant tree seedlings to renew forested ecosystems. Joe is attracted 
to Jessica and would like to ask her out to dinner. He wants to impress her, so he 
praises her volunteer work and donates $100 to the New Forest Trust. 
Control 
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office and also 
serves as a volunteer for a charity called the New Forest Trust. Jessica describes 
the effects of deforestation on old growth forests and explains how her charity 
raises money to plant tree seedlings to renew forested ecosystems. Joe donates 
$100 to the New Forest Trust.   
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to write about Joe’s 
motivations for the donation. After the writing task, they were asked to judge how large 
Joe’s donation was and how much good it would do to repair deforestation, measured on 
a 7-point scale.  They were also asked to judge how likeable, admirable and trustworthy 
Joe is, also on a 7-point scale. Judgments of the act and the actor were counterbalanced. 
Finally, as a manipulation check, participants were asked to judge the extent Joe was 
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intrinsically motivated, on a 7-point scale, followed by a similar judgment regarding how 
extrinsically motivated he was.  Upon completion of the questionnaire, the participants 
were thanked and debriefed. 
Participants’ ratings of variables relating to the donation (size and how much 
good it will do) were averaged to form a single measure labeled act evaluation (r = 0.57).  
The ratings of variables relating to judgments of the actor were averaged to form a single 
measure labeled actor evaluation (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.88). The correlation between 
the actor evaluation and the act evaluation was 0.66. The scale reliability analysis for the 
five variables related to evaluation of the actor returned a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.88, 
indicating a high degree of coherence, consistent with previous studies. The perceived 
motivation composite variable was calculated by subtracting the judgment of extrinsic 
motivation from the judgment of intrinsic motivation, such that positive values of 
perceived motivation indicate greater intrinsic motivation and negative values indicate 
greater extrinsic motivation. The same planned contrast codes established in Study 1 
were used to compare extrinsic vs. intrinsic and control conditions, and intrinsic vs. 
control, respectively. 
Results. We conducted a manipulation check followed by a series of primary 
analyses examining the planned contrasts between motivation conditions. 
Manipulation check. The composite variable of perceived motivation was 
analyzed as a manipulation check. In the extrinsic condition, the mean perceived 
motivation was -3.03 (SD = 2.62), indicating greater extrinsic motivation. In the intrinsic 
condition, the mean perceived motivation was 1.26 (SD = 3.10), indicating greater 
intrinsic motivation, and in the control condition, the mean was 0.26 (SD = 2.24), (F 
35 
(2,93) = 21.79, p < 0.0001), indicating greater intrinsic motivation was inferred in the 
absence of motivation information (See Table 3.1a).  
 
The mean of the extrinsic condition was significantly lower than intrinsic and 
control (t (95) = -6.47, p<0.001) and the means of intrinsic and control were not 
significantly different from each other (t (95) = 1.53, p = 0.13) (See Table 3.1b). There 
was a significant positive correlation between actor evaluation and act evaluation after 
controlling for motivation condition (r (93)= 0.659). The order of evaluation of actor and 
act had no significant effect on any results and was not analyzed further. 
 
Primary analyses. The donation of money to the New Forest Trust was judged 
significantly less favorably when the actor was extrinsically motivated (M = 3.26, SD = 
0.90) than when he was intrinsically motivated (M = 4.08, SD = 1.08) or when no 
motivation information was provided (M = 4.34, SD = 1.01), F (2,93) = 10.09, p < 
Table 3.1a
Study 3: Environmental Donation  
Judgment n M SD n M SD n M SD
Motivation
a 30 -3.03 2.62 35 0.26 2.24 31 1.26 3.10
Liking 30 3.24 1.00 35 4.77 1.28 31 4.74 1.20
Act Evaluation 30 3.26 0.90 35 4.34 1.01 31 4.08 1.08
a
Motivation serves as a manipulation check in this study
Extrinsic Control Intrinsic
Table 3.1b
Judgment t p t p
Motivation -6.47 0.00 1.53 0.13
Liking -5.85 0.00 -0.10 0.92
Act Evaluation -4.32 0.00 -1.08 0.28
Contrast (IvsC)Contrast (EvsIC)
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0.0001. The planned set of contrast codes established that the mean evaluation of the act 
performed by the extrinsically motivate actor was significantly lower than the evaluation 
of the act performed by the intrinsically motivated actor and the actor with no motivation 
information (t (95) = -4.32, p<0.001). The evaluation of the act performed by the 
intrinsically motivated actor and that of the control condition were not significantly 
different (t(95) = -1.08, p = 0.28). 
Likewise, the actor was judged to be far less likable when he was extrinsically 
motivated (M = 3.24, SD = 1.00) than when he was intrinsically motivated (M = 4.74, SD 
= 1.20), or when no motivation information was provided (M = 4.77, SD = 1.28), (F 
(2.93) = 17.18, p <0.0001). The extrinsically motivated act was evaluated significantly 
less favorably than intrinsic and control (t(95) = -5.85, p < 0.001. Intrinsic and control 
conditions did not differ significantly (t(95) = -0.10, p = 0.92). These results replicate the 
patterns in the humanitarian studies, confirming the effect of extrinsic motivation in 
reducing liking of the actor and favorability of evaluation of the act.   
Discussion. In this study, we examined whether the motivation bias seen in 
humanitarian settings is robust across different types of prosocial acts.  Despite the 
ambiguity of the environmental conservation domain, extrinsic motivation continues to 
exert a significant influence on evaluations of the actor and the act. In the environmental 
domain, a wide variety of opinions and interpretation of the science on environmental 
damage inform people’s views. Given this variety of perspectives, and increased moral 
ambiguity regarding the imperative to act, it is feasible that many people would believe 
that they are under no moral obligation to help the environment. They may therefore 
consider conservation activities to be more a consumer choice than a moral imperative, 
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resulting in wider acceptance of extrinsic motivations in conservation action. 
Additionally, the present reforestation study uses a tragedy of the commons scenario, in 
which the beneficiaries can be construed as a collective because society at large enjoys 
the benefits of reforested land and increased oxygen production. This aggregate 
beneficiary is far less personal, and the impact of the action, and of any cheating, could 
therefore seem far less direct. We chose environmental causes as a more conservative test 
of the motivation effect for these reasons. Although these differences could feasibly have 
reduced or eliminated the effect of motivation, the influence of motivation was consistent 
in the environmental context, supporting the robustness of the effect of motivation on 
evaluation, across different charitable focus areas. This generalizability suggests that the 
effect of motivation is related not to the specific beneficiary or domain of a prosocial act, 
but to the prosociality of the act and the perception of cheating in that exchange. Our 
evidence suggests that self-serving motivations would diminish the perceived impact of 
any such donation, regardless of the particular charitable cause.  
Study 4: Environmental Purchase 
Donations of money and time represent a particularly discrete form of prosocial 
act. However, it is important to understand how people would respond to a prosocial act 
that is less evaluable. Many acts of energy conservation convey both environmental 
benefits such as reduced energy consumption and personal benefits such as reduced 
energy bills, tax breaks, and the positive regard of others. This provides an opportunity to 
examine the effect of motivation in a more ambiguous situation with mixed benefits and 
multiple possible reasons for the behavior. The opportunity to accrue personal savings is 
one that few people would condemn, and thus this hybrid scenario provides yet a more 
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conservative test of the effect.   In situations that involve mixed benefits, the effect of 
motivation may be reduced or eliminated. This study moves from a highly evaluable 
prosocial act, the donation of dollars, to a more ambiguous act of conservation involving 
the purchase of a hybrid vehicle like the Prius. It is more difficult for participants to 
evaluate the actor because reasons for making such a high-value purchase are more 
complex than reasons for making a one-time small donation.  It is also more difficult for 
participants to evaluate the act itself, since it is less evaluable than a fixed number of 
dollars, and delivers a mixed set of benefits, including daily transportation, lower fuel 
cost, and lower pollution. Either of these differences could potentially ameliorate the 
effect observed in the previous studies. 
Method. Members of the public (N = 57) participated in the study on the internet 
through Amazon Mechanical Turk for compensation of $0.50. The average age of  
participants was 30 (SD = 11.27) and the sample was 68% female and 32% male. 
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of three vignettes about a person who 
purchased a hybrid vehicle.  The vignettes read as follows: 
Intrinsic 
Steve recently bought a new car. After comparing style, comfort and fuel 
efficiency, he chose a hybrid car and has been driving it regularly for 8 weeks. He 
drives 40 miles per day for his work commute, and 100 miles per weekend for 
recreation and running errands around town. He routinely gets 45 miles per gallon 
as promised in the auto company's marketing materials. Steve confided to a close 
friend that he is very pleased with the purchase of the hybrid car. He told his 
friend that he purchased the car to reduce his personal carbon footprint and to 
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improve the local environment. He cares deeply about conservation and his 
primary aim in making this purchase was to benefit the environment. He believes 
that each person must do their part to consume less fuel, produce less pollution, 
and encourage companies that are making investment in greener technology. 
Extrinsic 
Steve recently bought a new car. After comparing style, comfort and fuel 
efficiency, he chose a hybrid car and has been driving it regularly for 8 weeks. He 
drives 40 miles per day for his work commute, and 100 miles per weekend for 
recreation and running errands around town. He routinely gets 45 miles per gallon 
as promised in the auto company's marketing materials. Steve confided to a close 
friend that he is very pleased with the purchase of the hybrid car. He told his 
friend that he purchased the car to appear more environmentally conscious in 
order to impress members of an exclusive tennis club. He highly values his social 
status and his primary aim in making this purchase was to gain membership to the 
tennis club. He knows that certain influential club members in his neighborhood 
are very committed to the environment and conservation, and he believes by 
appearing 'greener', he will soon be able to convince them to sponsor his 
membership application. 
Control  
Steve recently bought a new car. After comparing style, comfort and fuel 
efficiency, he chose a hybrid car and has been driving it regularly for 8 weeks. He 
drives 40 miles per day for his work commute, and 100 miles per weekend for 
recreation and running errands around town. He routinely gets 45 miles per gallon 
40 
as promised in the auto company's marketing materials. Steve confided to a close 
friend that he is very pleased with the purchase of the hybrid car. 
After reading the vignette, participants were asked to write about Joe’s 
motivations for the purchase of the car. After the writing task, they were asked to judge 
how large the act of conservation was and how much good it would do to reduce 
pollution and energy consumption, measured on a 7-point scale. Participants were then 
asked how effective they thought hybrid vehicles generally are at reducing energy 
consumption and pollution. They were also asked to judge how much they like, admire 
and trust the actor, also on a 7-point scale. Judgments of the act and the actor were 
counterbalanced. Upon completion of the questionnaire, the participants were thanked 
and debriefed. 
Participants’ ratings of variables relating to the donation (size of the donation, 
how much good it will do, and how effective hybrid vehicles are at conserving energy) 
were averaged to form a single measure labeled act evaluation (Chronbach’s alpha = 
0.72).  The ratings of variables relating to judgments of the actor were averaged to form a 
single measure labeled actor evaluation (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.91). The scale reliability 
analysis for the five variables related to evaluation of the actor returned a coefficient 
alpha of 0.89, indicating a high degree of coherence. The correlation between the actor 
evaluation and the act evaluation was 0.64.The perceived motivation variable was created 
consistent with earlier studies. Planned contrast codes were established to make the same 
comparisons of extrinsic vs. intrinsic and control conditions, and intrinsic vs. control. The 
order of evaluation of actor and act had no significant effect on any results and was not 
analyzed further. 
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Results. We conducted a manipulation check followed by a series of primary 
analyses examining the planned contrasts between motivation conditions. 
Manipulation check. The composite variable of perceived motivation was 
analyzed as a manipulation check. In the extrinsic condition, the mean perceived 
motivation was -4.42 (SD = 1.57), indicating greater extrinsic motivation. In the intrinsic 
condition, the mean perceived motivation was 2.5 (SD = 2.31), indicating greater intrinsic 
motivation, and in the control condition, the mean was 1.3 (SD =2.68), indicating slightly 
more intrinsic than extrinsic motivation. The mean differences were significant (F(2,54) 
= 51.22, p < 0.0001 (See Table 3.2a).  
 
 
 The mean of the extrinsic condition was significantly lower than intrinsic and control (t 
(56) = -10.03 , p < 0.001) and the means of intrinsic and control were not significantly 
different from each other (t (56) = -1.65 , p = 0.11) (See Table 3.2b). 
Table 3.2a
Study 4: Environmental Purchase 
Judgment n M SD n M SD n M SD
Motivation
a 19 -4.42 1.57 20 1.30 2.68 18 2.50 2.31
Liking 19 2.82 1.20 20 5.10 1.04 18 5.31 0.99
Act Evaluation 19 4.18 1.05 20 5.00 1.20 18 4.81 1.12
a




Primary analyses. The hybrid purchase was judged less favorably when the actor 
was extrinsically motivated by the pursuit of tennis club membership (M = 4.18, SD = 
1.05) than when he was intrinsically motivated (M = 4.82, SD = 1.12) or when no 
motivation information was provided (M = 5.0, SD = 1.20) (F (2,54) = 2.84, p = 0.067). 
Though the overall model was only marginally significant, the planned set of contrast 
codes established that the mean evaluation of the act performed by the extrinsically 
motivate actor was significantly lower than the evaluation of the act performed by the 
intrinsically motivated actor and the actor with no motivation information (t (56)= -2.31, 
p = 0.03). The evaluation of the act performed by the intrinsically motivated actor and 
that of the control condition were not significantly different (t(56) = 0.51, p = 0.62). 
Table 3.2
Study 4: Environmental Purchase 
Judgment n M SD n M SD n M SD t p t p
Motivation
a 19 -4.42 1.57 20 1.30 2.68 18 2.50 2.31 -10.03 0.00 -1.65 0.11
Liking 19 2.82 1.20 20 5.10 1.04 18 5.31 0.99 -7.67 0.00 -0.08 0.38
Act Evaluation 19 4.18 1.05 20 5.00 1.20 18 4.81 1.12 -2.31 0.03 0.51 0.62
a
Motivation serves as a manipulation check in this study
Contrast (IvsC)Extrinsic Control Intrinsic Contrast (EvsIC)
 Likewise, the actor was judged to be less likable when he was extrinsically 
motivated (M = 2.83, SD = 1.20) than when he was intrinsically motivated (M = 5.32, SD 
= .99), or when no motivation information was provided (M = 5.10, SD = 1.04), (F (2,54) 
= 29.60, p < 0.0001). The likeability judgment was significantly lower in the extrinsic 
Table 3.2b
Judgment t p t p
Motivation -10.03 0.00 -1.65 0.11
Liking -7.67 0.00 -0.08 0.38
Act Evaluation -2.31 0.03 0.51 0.62
Contrast (IvsC)Contrast (EvsIC)
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condition than in the intrinsic and control conditions (t(56) = -7.67, p  < 0.001) and the 
intrinsic and control conditions did not differ (t(56) = -0.08, p = 0.38). There was a 
significant positive correlation between actor evaluation and act evaluation after 
controlling for motivation condition (r (54)= 0.645). These results replicate the patterns 
in the previous donation studies, confirming the effect of extrinsic motivation in reducing 
liking of the actor and favorability of evaluation of the act when considering acts other 
than monetary donation.  
Discussion. This study investigated the effect of motivation on evaluation of 
prosocial acts that are more complex in benefits and potential impact, in the area of green 
consumerism. This study provides evidence that the effect of motivation on evaluations 
of the actor and the act is robust across different, less evaluable, types of prosocial acts.  
Despite the ambiguity of a purchase that conveys personal benefits as well as 
environmental benefits, extrinsic motivation markedly reduces the favorability of 
evaluation of the actor and the act. This suggests that even when the act produces mixed 
benefits, and only a portion of the act is actually prosocial, extrinsic motivation can still 
contaminate the act and reduce the favorability of the evaluation significantly. 
This chapter has extended the investigation to the environmental domain in order 
to test whether more morally ambiguous prosocial acts and acts that are inherently a 
mixture of prosocial and self-interested outcomes would reduce or eliminate the effect of 
motivation on evaluative judgments. We found the effect of motivation to be robust in 
this extension, suggesting that the effect is of broader applicability than a narrow slice of 
charitable activity. In the next chapter, we explore some aspects of the underlying 
mechanism.  
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Chapter Four: Exploring the Underlying Mechanism 
Having established the influence of motivation of evaluative judgments in 
multiple domains, we next explore some aspects of the mechanism. We have proposed 
that the effect relies upon a coherent evaluation of the actor and upon negative 
associations with extrinsic motivation. We designed two studies to explore these two 
aspects of the effect. The pilot study in Chapter 1 suggested that an initiating act can 
cause judgments of liking and motivation to organize into a single construct. We have 
demonstrated the coherence of the likeability and motivation variables in the previous 
studies, supporting the idea of a single construct. We now explore the bidirectional 
relationship between likeability and motivation by manipulating likeability and 
examining its effect on perceived motivation. Following this study, we examine both the 
motivational inferences that result from the absence of motivation information, as well as 
examining the effect of reduced autonomy as a self determination theory explanation for 
the effect of extrinsic motivation on judgment.    
Study 5: Humanitarian Donation with Liking Manipulation 
From prior research, there is evidence that people attempt to create coherence 
between traits and mental states (Reeder et al, 2002; Malle, 2004) in attributing meaning 
to others’ behavior. For example, an observer may use the logic that if a person is 
generally a good/bad person, they are likely to do good/bad things for good/bad reasons.  
Our first four studies have demonstrated one direction of influence, showing that 
motivation information influences the likeability of the actor. Based on the assumption of 
a single construct of actor evaluation, we expect that manipulation of the likeability of an 
actor would similarly influence judgments of the actor’s motivations. Initial evidence of 
45 
this relationship was reported by Van Boven and colleagues (2010), showing that people 
judge a likable person to be more likely to make an intrinsically motivated career choice. 
We approached the relationship between liking and motivation, and a predicted joint 
effect on evaluation of the act, by seeking to establish a “causal chain.” (Spencer, Zanna 
& Fong, 2005).  This approach is described as using experimental design to directly 
manipulate one dimension of the non-motivational impression, and then measure the 
evaluation of the act. This approach allows us to establish relationships between 
motivation and liking, to test whether that relationship is bidirectional, and to examine 
the joint effect on act evaluation.    
To investigate the relationship between likeability and motivation as part of a 
causal chain, we used the humanitarian donation paradigm, manipulating the likeability 
of the actor and measuring judgments of the perceived motivation of the actor.  No 
motivation information was provided.  
Method. Members of the public (N = 96) participated in the study on the internet 
through Mechanical Turk for compensation of $0.50. The average age of participants was 
32 (SD – 11.17) and the sample was 52% female, 46% male and 2% unreported. 
Participants were randomly assigned to read one of three vignettes about a person, Joe, 
who made a $100 donation to the charity called Malaria Action.  The three conditions 
manipulated the likeability of an actor, using traits drawn from Anderson’s extensive 
work on likableness ratings of 555 traits (1968). Three likable traits and three unlikable 
traits were selected from the Anderson work and incorporated into the descriptions of 
Joe. In the likable condition, Joe was described as kind (#18 out of 555), friendly (#19) 
and helpful (#45), with a mean likeability score of 5.10 on a 7-point scale. In the 
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unlikable condition, Joe was described as obnoxious (#549), opinionated (#294) and 
insulting (#542), with an average likeability score of 1.25. In the control condition, no 
information on likeability was provided.  The vignettes read as follows: 
Likeable 
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe is considered by friends and work colleagues to be a kind, 
friendly person. He is the helpful one who will always volunteer to help a friend 
move. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office and also serves as a 
volunteer for a charity called Malaria Action. Jessica describes the effects of 
malaria in Africa and explains how her charity raises money to buy   mosquito 
nets to protect African children. Joe decides to donate $100 to Malaria Action. 
Unlikable 
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe is considered by friends and work colleagues to be quite 
obnoxious and opinionated. He is known to be insulting, often embarrassing his 
friends in front of others. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office 
and also serves as a volunteer for a charity called Malaria Action. Jessica 
describes the effects of malaria in Africa and explains how her charity raises 
money to buy mosquito nets to protect African children. Joe decides to donate 
$100 to Malaria Action. 
Control 
Joe is a financial advisor who works for a bank in Boulder. He makes a salary of 
$70K per year. Joe runs into Jessica, a woman who works at his office and also 
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serves as a volunteer for a charity called Malaria Action. Jessica describes the 
effects of malaria in Africa and explains how her charity raises money to buy 
mosquito nets to protect African children. Joe decides to donate $100 to Malaria 
Action. 
After reading the vignette, participants wrote about Joe’s character. After the 
writing task, they were asked to judge how large Joe’s donation was and how much good 
it would do to combat malaria, measured on a 7-point scale, and how intrinsically and 
extrinsically motivated Joe was.  They were also asked to judge how admirable, likeable 
and trustworthy Joe is, also on a 7-point scale, as a manipulation check. Judgments of the 
act and the actor were counterbalanced. Upon completion of the questionnaire, the 
participants were thanked and debriefed.  
Participants’ ratings of variables relating to the donation (size and impact) were 
averaged to form a single measure labeled act evaluation (r = 0.302).  The ratings of 
variables relating to judgments of the actor were averaged to form a single measure 
labeled actor evaluation (Chronbach’s alpha = 0.87). The scale reliability analysis for the 
five variables related to evaluation of the actor returned a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.891, 
indicating a high degree of coherence. The correlation between perceived motivation and 
actor evaluation was 0.75. The correlation between the actor evaluation and the act 
evaluation was 0.65. A new set of planned contrast codes were established to compare the 
unlikable condition to likable and control conditions, and likable vs. control, respectively. 
The order of evaluation of actor and act had no significant effect on any results and was 
not analyzed further. 
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Results. We conducted a manipulation check followed by a series of primary 
analyses examining the planned contrasts between motivation conditions. 
Manipulation check. The composite variable of perceived motivation was 
analyzed as a manipulation check. The actor was judged to be less likable when he was 
described as having unlikable traits (M = 3.41, SD = 1.3) than when he was described as 
having likable traits (M = 5.66, SD = 1.1), or when no likeability information was 
provided (M = 4.89, SD = 1.1), (F(2,93) = 29.66, p < 0.0001), confirming that the 
likeability manipulation was effective (See Table 4.1a). 
 
 The mean of the extrinsic condition was significantly lower than intrinsic and 
control (t (95) = - 7.28, p<0.001) and the means of intrinsic and control were significantly 
different from each other (t (95) = 2.58, p = 0.01) (See Table 4.1b). There was a 
significant positive correlation between perceived motivation and act evaluation after 
controlling for liking condition (r (93)= 0.607). 
 
Table 4.1a
Study 5: Humanitarian Donation Liking 
Judgment n M SD n M SD n M SD
Motivation 33 -1.88 2.92 32 0.56 2.86 31 2.29 2.67
Liking
a 33 3.41 1.30 32 4.89 1.15 31 5.66 1.10
Act Evaluation 33 4.13 1.12 32 4.74 1.16 31 4.68 1.12
a
Liking serves as a manipulation check in this study
Unlikable Control Likable
Table 4.1b
Judgment t p t p
Motivation -5.45 0.00 2.43 0.02
Liking -7.28 0.00 2.58 0.01
Act Evaluation -2.37 0.02 -0.22 0.83
Contrast (LvsC)Contrast (UvsLC)
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Primary analyses. The evaluation of the donation was judged less favorably when 
the actor was unlikable (M = 4.13, SD = 1.12) than when he was likable (M = 4.68, SD = 
1.12) or when no likeability information was provided (M = 4.74, SD = 1.16), (F(2,93) = 
2.84, p = 0.064). The planned set of contrast codes established that the mean evaluation 
of the act performed by the unlikable actor was significantly lower than the evaluation of 
the act performed by the likable actor and the actor with no likeability information (t (95) 
= -2.37, p = 0.02). The evaluation of the act performed by the likable actor and that of the 
control condition were not significantly different (t (95) = -0.22, p = 0.83.  
The less likable actor was judged to be significantly more extrinsically motivated 
(M = - 1.88, SD = 2.92)  than were the likable actor (M = 2.29, SD = 2.67) and the actor 
for whom no likeability information was provided (M = 0.56, SD = 2.86), (F(2,93) = 
17.65, p < 0.0001). These results replicate the patterns established in the motivation 
studies, and provide evidence that lower likeability reduces the favorability of evaluation 
of the prosocial act relative to the evaluation of the act in the intrinsic and control 
conditions.  Additionally, the unlikable actor is perceived as being significantly more 
extrinsically motivated than the likable actor or the neutral actor, confirming a close 
association between motivation and likeability.  
Discussion.  By demonstrating parallel effects of motivation and liking, we 
establish evidence suggesting that people experience motivation and liking as the same 
construct. People can evaluate an actor using either likeability information or motivation 
information, producing highly correlated liking and motivation judgments, and producing 
the same pattern evaluation of the prosocial act. We propose that these findings, in 
combination with the pilot study and the scale reliability analyses of each of the 
50 
foregoing studies provide strong support for our contention that motivation not only 
influences the evaluation of the actor, but is in fact an integral part of that evaluation. 
Study 6: Free vs. Forced Choice 
The extrinsic motivations in the previous studies present situations in which the 
actor freely chooses to engage in an act for reasons that are overtly self-interested.  This 
study is designed to present prosocial acts for which no motive or trait information is 
provided. Rather, the situation is set up so that intrinsic motives can be inferred from the 
free choice condition, but not from the forced choice condition. 
This study offers the opportunity to examine the effect of a reduction in the 
autonomy of the actor, and at the same time, examine motivation inferences that are made 
in conditions where no motivation information is provided. Self determination theory, 
which underpins overjustification, motivational crowding and other perspectives on 
motivation, suggests that the exercise of autonomy is a basic human need (Deci & Ryan, 
2000). Further, it suggests that a forced choice will be experienced as a reduction in 
autonomy. The forced choice condition reframes extrinsic motivation from the self-
interested act in pursuit of separable outcomes to being compelled by an external force to 
perform the same act, both of which are on the continuum of extrinsic motivation 
presented in self determination theory. The purpose of this study is to determine whether 
previously demonstrated motivation effects are due to the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of the 
person or act, or if the effect remains in when motivation is presented in the context of 
locus of control, without clear valence.  
Method. The study involved 84 participants who were drawn from an 
undergraduate subject pool and who participated for course credit. The sample was 61% 
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female and 39% male. Participants read one of two scenarios describing a person who 
received an inheritance from a distant relative and subsequently donated some of the 
inheritance to a cancer research charity.  In the free choice condition, the person freely 
chose to make the donation and in the forced choice condition, the person was directed to 
make the donation by the terms of the relative’s will.   The vignettes read as follows: 
Free choice 
Joe unexpectedly inherits $5000 from a distant uncle who died of cancer. Joe 
decides that he wants to donate $1000 of the inheritance to a charity that funds 
cancer research.  Joe makes the donation to the American Cancer Foundation. An 
article in the American Cancer Foundation’s annual report explains that Joe chose 
to use some of his inheritance to support cancer research. 
Forced choice 
Joe unexpectedly inherits $5000 from a distant uncle who died of cancer.  The 
terms of his uncle’s will require that Joe donate $1000 of the inheritance to a 
charity that funds cancer research.  Joe makes the donation to the American 
Cancer Foundation. An article in the American Cancer Foundation’s annual report 
explains that Joe carried out the wishes of his uncle to support cancer research. 
Participants then answered a series of questions about the person and the action 
described.  The dependent variables drawn from previous studies, regarding the size and 
impact of the donation and the likeability of the actor.  Upon completion of the 
questionnaire, the participants completed a number of unrelated surveys and were then 
thanked and debriefed. The actor evaluation and the act evaluation composite variables 
and the contrast codes were constructed consistent with earlier studies. 
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Results. Perceived motivation judgments were not collected in this study, so there 
was no manipulation check to report. Participant judgments of the act and the actor in the 
free choice condition followed patterns found in the extrinsic condition of earlier studies, 
though not all comparisons were significant. The composite variable act evaluation was 
not significant, so the component variables of size and impact are reported separately. 
Participants judged the freely chosen donation to be significantly larger than the forced 
donation (Ms = 4.64 and 4.07, and SDs 1.19 and 1.37, respectively; t(83) = 2.05, p = 
0.044; See Tables 4.2).    
 
The judgment of donation impact for cancer research was not significant but was 
directional. Likewise, participants judged the actor who freely chose to make the 
donation more favorably than the actor who complied with the conditions of the will (Ms 
= 5.68 and 4.43, and SDs 0.89 and1.15, respectively; t(83) = 5.59, p < 0.001). There was 
a significant positive correlation between actor evaluation and act evaluation after 
controlling for choice condition (r (81)= 0.384). 
Discussion. In previous studies, judgments of the act and the actor in the intrinsic 
and control produce similar results, implying that when no motive information is 
presented, people assume that the actor is intrinsically motivated. In the studies designed 
with three motivation conditions, there is no way to compare intrinsic to control, and the 
Table 4.2
Study 6: Free vs. Forced Choice 
Mean Difference
Judgment n M SD n M SD t p
Liking 42 5.68 0.89 42 4.43 1.15 5.59 0.00
Act Impact 42 4.05 1.51 42 3.88 1.31 0.54 0.59
Act Size 42 4.64 1.19 42 4.07 1.37 2.05 0.04
Free Choice Forced Choice
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only evidence is the null effect. In the free vs. forced choice study, we introduced a 
design allowing inferences about the control condition. Behavior is constrained in this 
design, providing for a situational constant. The results show that when the actor freely 
chooses to perform a prosocial act, in the absence of motive information (the equivalent 
of the control condition), people make positive inferences about the person and their 
motivation.  This is consistent with self-focused judgments made in overjustification 
studies, which suggests that in the absence of an extrinsic motivator, people may draw on 
own experience to infer that the actor must have been intrinsically motivated.  
Additionally, these findings are consistent with the explanation for the negative 
associations with extrinsic motivation that results from a loss of autonomy. The forced 
choice condition, a constrained autonomy condition, produced the same pattern of results 
as extrinsic motivation has produced in the previous studies. Likewise, free exercise of 
autonomy follows the pattern of intrinsic motivation in its effect on evaluative judgment 
of the act.  Self determination theory places extrinsically motivated acts on a continuum 
of autonomy, ranging from completely compelled action, which is essentially 
unintentional, such as acts performed under duress by a prisoner, to intentional and 
desired actions that are motivated by a separable outcome, such as image management. 
The extrinsically motivated acts we have chosen for the current research have been freely 
chosen, intentional acts that are motivated by a separable outcome. These findings 
demonstrate that a manipulation of the separability of outcome, and manipulation of 
autonomy of action produce the same pattern of judgments, potentially pointing to further 
mechanism studies for the future. 
Study 7: Manipulation of Time 
54 
The effect of extrinsic motivation on evaluations of prosocial acts has been 
established for constant levels of prosocial contribution. We hypothesized that varying 
the amount of prosocial contribution may moderate the effect of motivation.  Study 7 was 
designed to examine whether the differences in judgments of extrinsically and 
intrinsically motivated actors and their acts might be reduced when the actor is making an 
objectively larger contribution. We manipulated motivation as in previous studies, and in 
addition, varied the number of hours the volunteer contributed to an after school program. 
The study was designed to test the hypotheses that participants will evaluate extrinsically 
motivated Dan and his volunteer time less favorably than for the intrinsically motivated 
Dan, and to test the effect of magnitude of time donated on evaluations of the act and 
actor. 
Method.  Students were approached at the university’s student center and were 
asked to participate in a psychological research study (N=123) for compensation of one 
dollar. The sample was 59% female and 41% male. The study was a between subjects 
design that crossed motivation (intrinsic or extrinsic) with hours volunteered (2 hours, 5 
hours, or 15 hours, selected using an informal pilot study), with productivity per hour 
held constant. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the six conditions. 
Participants read a vignette about Dan, who volunteers to help build snack packs for the 
students who attend the after school program for disadvantaged youth. The vignettes read 
as follows with text for different conditions indicated in italics and parentheses: 
Dan is a senior at a college in the West. One day Dan sees an ad on campus 
recruiting students to volunteer for an after school program for disadvantaged 
youth. The program offers attendees enriching activities to keep them off the 
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streets and in a safe environment. The program needs volunteers to help prepare 
snack packs for the students who attend the program. 
Dan knew that he had plenty of spare time and was looking for a way to give 
back to the community. Dan knew that many of the students do not have safe, 
enriching places to go to after the school day and are likely faced with crime, 
drugs and violence everyday. Dan hoped that by volunteering for ASOP he would 
be contributing to the effort to provide the students with enriching programs and a 
safe environment. (Dan was starting to think about finding a job after he 
graduated and knew that having experience in a charitable organization and 
seeing how the program works would be good for his resume and help him get a 
job. Dan knew that the volunteering would help develop ties with his boss who 
would write him a letter of recommendation.) Dan decided to volunteer for the 
after school program. At orientation he learned that he must work at least one 
hour a week, but could work as much as he wanted after that. ASOP volunteers 
help build the snack packs that are given out to students who attend the program. 
On average volunteers like Dan are able to build 50 snack packs per hour. The 
snack packs contain; one piece of fruit, granola bar, fruit snack, juice pack, and a 
fun puzzle.  
The program operates at 15 grade schools in the district and provides after school 
activities for over 2300 students. Dan volunteers 2 hours a week and builds 100 
snack packs (5 hours a week and builds 250 snack packs), (15 hours a week and 
builds 750 snack packs). 
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After reading the vignette, participants responded to questions regarding the value 
and size of Dan’s prosocial act and about Dan himself. Participants’ ratings of the Act 
Evaluation was created by aggregating their responses to the questions, “how much good 
will the volunteer time do,” and “how significant is the volunteer work,” and “how hard 
does Dan work.” Participants responded on a Likert scale from 1 (not much good/ not 
very significant/ not very hard) to 7 (a lot of good/ very significant/ very hard). The 
measures were found to be internally consistent, α = 0.775. Additionally, participants 
indicated how admirable they found Dan to be, on a 7-point scale (not at all admirable = 
1 to extremely admirable = 7).   
Results.  The composite measure of Act Evaluation and the Actor admirability 
measure were tested. The mean values for the evaluation of the prosocial act showed that 
when the actor was intrinsically motivated, the act was evaluated more favorably as the 
number of volunteer hours increased (M = 4.01, 4.58 and 4.88 for 2 hours, 5 hours and 15 
hours, respectively) (See table 4.3). When the actor was extrinsically motivated, however, 
the evaluation was relatively low for both 2 hours and 5 hours (M = 3.80 and 4.03, 
respectively), however for 15 hours of volunteer time, the act evaluation for extrinsic 
motivation (M = 4.90) was essentially equal to the intrinsically motivated act evaluation 
at 15 hours.  
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In a model predicting act evaluation using motivation, linear time, a quadratic 
coding of time, and the two-way interactions between motivation and linear and quadratic 
time, we found no significant main effects or interactions (See Table 4.4).  
 
 
Looking at the simple effect of motivation at each time point, there is no significant 
difference between the participants’ responses by motivation condition at the smallest, 2 
hours, and largest, 15 hours time periods volunteered per week. There is a significant 
difference at the 5 hours per week time period between participants who know Dan to be 
intrinsically motivated (M = 4.58, SD = 0.95) and those who know him to be extrinsically 
Table 4.3
Study 7: Time Manipulation
Act Eval n M SD n M SD n M SD
Intrinsic 22 4.01 1.02 18 4.58 0.95 23 4.88 0.78
Extrinsic 3.80 1.15 4.03 0.94 4.90 1.07
Actor Eval n M SD n M SD n M SD
Intrinsic 22 5.50 1.10 18 5.35 1.18 23 5.45 1.10
Extrinsic 3.75 1.52 3.50 1.51 4.83 1.40
Hours Volunteered





Study 7: Motivation x Time
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta t Sig.
(Constant) 3.91 0.45 8.80 0.00
Motivation 0.66 0.89 0.30 0.74 0.46
Time Linear 0.06 0.06 0.33 1.08 0.28
Time Quadratic 0.03 0.80 0.01 0.04 0.97
Mot x Tim Lin -0.07 0.12 -0.30 -0.60 0.55
Mot x Tim Quad 0.74 1.59 0.14 0.47 0.64
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motivated (M = 4.03, SD = 0.94), t(38) = 2.54, p = 0.017. There was a significant positive 
partial correlation between actor evaluation and act evaluation after controlling for 
motivation condition, consistent with previous studies (r (119)= 0.424). 
 There was a main effect of motivation on actor evaluation, with the intrinsically 
motivated actor evaluated significantly more favorably than the extrinsically motivated 
actor across time values (F(1,122) = 35.34, p < 0.0001). There was also a main effect of 
time on the actor evaluation, with the actor being evaluated more favorably as number of 
volunteer hours increased (F(2, 121) = 3.24, p = 0.043. The interaction between 
motivation and time was marginal in the expected direction (F(2,121) = 2.81, p = 0.064). 
Testing for a simple effect of motivation at the 2 hour level shows that participants 
reported significantly more admiration for the intrinsically motivated Dan (M = 5.50, SD 
= 1.10) than for the extrinsically motivated Dan (M = 3.75, SD = 1.52), t(40) = 4.31, p 
<0.001. There was also a significant difference at the 5 hours level such that participants 
view the intrinsically motivated Dan as more admirable (M = 5.35, SD = 1.18) than for 
the extrinsically motivated Dan (M = 3.03, SD = 1.51), t(36) = 4.65, p <0.001. There was 
no significant difference between participants who saw Dan as extrinsically motivated or 
intrinsically motivated at the 15 hour per week time period. 
 The simple effects of time volunteered on the participants’ ratings of admiration 
for Dan shows that there is no difference between the 2, 5, or 15 hours volunteered per 
week when Dan is intrinsically motivated. Participants who saw Dan as extrinsically 
motivated, there was no difference between those who learned Dan volunteered 2 hours 
and those who learned Dan volunteered 5 hours a week. The simple effects show a 
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pattern in which participants who see Dan as intrinsically motivated do not change in 
their admiration for him depending on the amount of time that he volunteers.  
Discussion. Participants who see Dan as extrinsically motivated considered him 
to be significantly less admirable, compare to participants’ ratings of the intrinsically 
motivated Dan only at the low levels of time volunteered, 2 and 5 hours a week. 
However, once the time donation reaches 15 hours per week, the difference is diminished 
between participants’ ratings depending on whether they see Dan as intrinsically or 
extrinsically motivated. 
Likewise, when the extrinsically motivated actor reaches 15 hours per week of 
volunteer time, he is evaluated with an equivalent level of favorability as the intrinsic 
actor, essentially ‘buying’ positive regard by contributing an indisputably large amount of 
time to the prosocial cause. Thus, motives matter to observers for low levels of 
contribution, but as the contribution reaches indisputably large size, observers will adjust 
their evaluative judgments in spite of the motive information. It is almost as if they are 
saying “anyone who gives that much time must really care, despite what they say their 
motives are.” Participants who see Dan as intrinsically motivated do not differ in their 
admiration for him across the different time periods, and though the extrinsically 
motivated Dan is evaluated less favorably at lower levels of contribution, he is able to 
recover his image by putting in more hours, essentially ‘buying’ the positive regard of 
observers. This result gives us an indication of the boundaries of the motivation effect 
relative to size, in that while motivation will affect subjective size judgments of the act, 




Chapter Five: Implications for Consumer Behavior 
The studies presented thus far have established evidence for the hypothesis that 
motivation can influence judgments across a number of prosocial contexts. It is not clear, 
however, that motivation is of sufficient importance and relevance to the observer to 
cause them to act on the motivation information. In Studies 8 and 9, we wanted to extend 
the study from judgment to choice. The expression of personal choice, particularly in 
Study 8, may be a more a conservative test that is less prone to self-presentational 
concerns. 
Study 8: Light Bulb Choice 
Earlier studies used a between subjects design, presenting only one motivation 
condition to each person, so participants had no opportunity to compare alternatives and 
choose between them. This within subjects design, participants are able to directly 
compare alternatives presented with equivalent, evaluable acts but with different 
motivational contexts. The opportunity to make direct comparisons in this within subjects 
design enables us to rule out pure evaluability as an alternative interpretation. By 
comparing both versions, one can easily evaluate the relative quality of the products (or 
donations), which means that the results are not limited to targets that are difficult to 
evaluate. 
 In the light bulb study, we chose to present two functionally equivalent energy-
efficient compact fluorescent light bulbs that vary in desirability of color and brightness 
for joint evaluation. Though of the same wattage and life span, one type of bulb emitted a 
warm, soft light and the other emitted a brighter, blue-tinged light. According to the 
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Oregon Energy Trust, soft light bulbs tend to be preferred by consumers over bright 
white.  The study was designed to explore whether joint comparison of different 
motivations would produce an effect strong enough to reverse product preference.  
Method. The study was conducted in a busy retail space with 58 members of the 
public participating in the study in exchange for a small gift of a compact fluorescent 
light bulb valued at approximately $5.  The average age of participants was 42 (SD = 
9.87), and the sample was 47% female and 53% male. People were recruited as they 
circulated through the retail space, by asking them if they would be willing to complete 
an energy conservation questionnaire in exchange for an energy efficient light bulb.  
People who approached the table were asked to complete the questionnaire, and in return, 
were given an opportunity to select one of two CFLs offered as free gifts by two fictional 
charities. In the control condition, only the name of the charity and product information 
on the light bulbs was presented, highlighting soft or bright light as the only differences 
between them, as follows.   
A. A Free Gift from the Council for Conservation Education 
Compact Fluorescent Light Bulb 
• Replaces a 60 watt incandescent bulb 
• Bright White light 
B. A Free Gift from the Association for Energy Efficiency 
Compact Fluorescent Light Bulb 
• Replaces a 60 watt incandescent bulb 
• Soft White light 
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In the motivation condition, motivation information was presented with the product 
information:   
A. Council for Conservation Education 
The Council for Conservation Education (CCE) is promoting this compact 
fluorescent product as part of a project to help the environment now and in the 
future, for the greater good. They are distributing light bulbs as an effective way 
to introduce consumers to simple, inexpensive conservation measures they can 
take in their own homes. Many large local retailers have volunteered to support 
the project by offering rebates for the purchase of this product.  
B. Association for Energy Efficiency 
The Association for Energy Efficiency (AEE) is promoting this compact 
fluorescent product as part of an initiative to capitalize on the attention to green 
initiatives in order to reap greater market share and profit for the founder’s local 
businesses. They chose to distribute light bulbs as free gifts because they can 
affect purchasing and voting behavior of many individuals. The AEE has 
negotiated with many large local retailers to offer rebates for the purchase of this 
product in exchange for promotional consideration.  
Once the participants completed the energy conservation questionnaire, they were 
asked to read the information on the light bulbs and choose the gift offer they wanted to 
accept. They made their choice by checking a box next to their chosen offer; the two 
offers were presented side by side on one sheet of paper, counterbalanced in order. They 
were then given a bag containing their choice of bulb and a variety of conservation 
pamphlets provided by Oregon Energy Trust, and thanked for their participation. I 
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predicted that people would be more likely to choose the less desirable light bulb offered 
by the intrinsically motivated charity than the more desirable light bulb offered by the 
extrinsically motivated charity. 
Results. The control condition provided product information with no motivation 
information, which provided a baseline for the relative desirability of the two products 
offered. In this condition, 18 of the 27 people who completed the questionnaire and chose 
a gift chose the soft light bulb and nine people chose the bright light bulb, confirming the 
guidance from the Oregon Energy Trust that the soft light bulb is generally the more 
desirable product. In the motivation condition, 10 of the 31 people who completed the 
questionnaire and chose a gift  chose the soft light bulb, which was offered by the 
extrinsically motivated charity, and 21 people chose the bright light bulb, offered by the 
intrinsically motivated charity (See Table 5.1).  
 
When tested against an expected equal distribution between the two products, the 
result is marginal (χ2 (3) = 7.086, p = 0.069). When tested against the control condition 
baseline product preference for our sample, however, the clear preference reversal from 
the control condition to the motivation condition is significant (Fisher’s exact p = 0.017).  
Table 5.1
Study 8: Light Bulb Field Product Choice Frequencies
Product Offer





Bright/Intrinsic 21 9 30
Soft/Extrinsic 10 18 28




Discussion. In this field sample, it was clear that motivation is important enough 
to people to cause them to select a product that is clearly less desirable. This reversal 
builds on insights from earlier studies to show that not only do people intentionally 
consider motivation information that is not directly relevant to their judgment, they will 
also use that information to intentionally choose an inferior product in order to make a 
statement about the motivations in question.  
Study 9: Charity Mountain Climb 
A second study was designed to further explore behavioral implications, 
examining the influence of motivation information on a joint evaluation choice. This 
study was designed to examine whether people would choose not to maximize a 
hypothetical donation in order to give more money to an intrinsically motivated volunteer 
and less money to an extrinsically motivated volunteer.  This study offers a more 
conservative test of the effect.  
Method. This study involved 51 participants who were drawn from an 
undergraduate subject pool and who participated for course credit. The sample was 53% 
female and 47% male. Participants were presented with descriptions of two volunteers 
who were both climbing a mountain to raise money for the same charity that funds cancer 
research. The vignettes read as follows: 
Intrinsic 
Your friend Joe will camp out on a Saturday night at the base of Long’s Peak and 
will begin the climb at 2am Sunday morning, arriving at the summit around 8am 
and finishing around 1pm Sunday afternoon.  Joe is trying to raise $1000 for the 
National Cancer Research Foundation, a highly regarded charity, and he cannot 
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climb unless he reaches this goal.  Joe says he would not normally climb a 
mountain and is a bit scared, but he is doing the climb because he knows several 
people who have suffered from cancer and he really wants to help fund research. 
Extrinsic 
Your friend Pete will stay in a basic hut on Saturday night at the base of Long’s 
Peak and will begin the climb at 2am Sunday morning, arriving at the summit 
around 8am and finishing around 1pm Sunday afternoon. Pete needs to raise 
$1000 for the American Cancer Fund, a highly regarded charity, and he cannot 
climb unless he reaches this goal. Pete says that he doesn’t know anything about 
the charity, but he and his climbing buddies have been wanting to climb Long’s 
anyway, and this way he gets a free guide and he can get the bragging rights 
before most of his friends.   
In both cases, the climber was required to raise $1000 to participate in the climb, 
and all funds raised by both climbers went to the charity.  Therefore, a donation of $20 or 
$30, regardless of allocation to climbers, was effectively a donation directly to the 
charity. Participants were asked to choose one of two donations allocated differently 
between the two climbers but ultimately going to the same charity. Participants were 
randomly assigned to one of two conditions.  In the control condition, they chose between 
donating $30, equally divided between the climbers and donating $20, equally divided 
between the climbers.  In the unequal distribution condition, they chose between donating 
$30, with $5 going to the intrinsically motivated climber and $25 to the extrinsically 
motivated climber, and donating $20, with $15 going to the intrinsically motivated 
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climber and $5 going to the extrinsically motivated climber.  See Table 5.2 for the 
distributions. Once they had made their choice, they were thanked and debriefed. 
 
Results. In the control condition, in which the $30 and $20 donation choices were 
equally split between the two climbers, 20 participants chose to donate $30 and three 
participants chose to donate $20, demonstrating a clear tendency to maximize their 
hypothetical donation. In the unequal distribution condition, in which the $30 donation 
favored the extrinsically motivated climber and the $20 donation favored the intrinsically 
motivated climber, six people chose to donate $30 and 22 people chose to donate $20.   
 
When analyzed using an expected equal distribution across the choice categories, 
the observed distributions are significantly different from expected (χ2(3) = 21.86, p < 
Table 5.2
Study 9: Charity Mountain Climb Donation Choices Presented to Participants
Condition Donation Total $ to Intrinsic $ to Extrinsic
Unequal $30 $5 $25
$20 $15 $5




Study 9: Charity Mountain Climb Donation Choice Results 
Condition Donate $30 Donate $20 Total
Unequal 6 22 28
Control 20 3 23




0.0001). When analyzed using our baseline preferences from the control condition, the 
preference reversal was significant (Fisher’s exact p <0.001). 
Discussion. When given the opportunity to reward the intrinsically motivated 
climber and/or punish the extrinsically motivated climber, people reversed preference 
dramatically, choosing to donate less to the charity to ensure that more went to the 
intrinsically motivated climber.  This reversal occurred in spite of the participants being 
made aware that the only real effect of the $20 uneven allocation was to donate less 
money to the good cause.   This result provides further evidence that people will actively 
adjust their behavior in response to motivation information.   
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Chapter Six: General Discussion 
Prosocial acts make great news. The media is full of stories, then passed on as 
Facebook posts, of landmark donations and small acts of kindness alike. Sadly, prosocial 
acts gone wrong seem to make for even better news.  Headlines about the best-selling 
book on mountaineering feats that led to heroic humanitarian work in Afghanistan, 
“Three Cups of Tea,” (2007) turned into almost gleeful headlines of “Three Cups of 
Deceit” when the self-enriching financial misdeeds and blatant fabrications of celebrated 
humanitarian and author Greg Mortenson were made public by journalist Jon Krakauer 
(2011). Such attention is clearly warranted in cases of real misdoing, when resources are 
diverted from the intended beneficiaries, for example.  Our interest, however, remains 
high in cases where no actual misdeeds have taken place, but the reasons for the good 
deeds raise the specter of wrongdoing through a perceived misallocation of social capital. 
The abiding interest shown by media and its consumers in prosocial acts and the 
underlying motives for those acts is consistent with the evolutionary view that detection 
of a wide variety of social wrongs is a critical activity for us as social animals.  The 
present research indicates that people judge prosocial acts and actors through the lens of 
motivation, denigrating an actor and her prosocial act because it was performed for 
extrinsic motives relative to the same act performed for intrinsic motives.   
Across the nine studies presented, participants consistently judged the 
extrinsically motivated actors to be less likable, less admirable and less trustworthy than 
the intrinsically motivated actor performing the identical act.  Likewise, participants 
judged the extrinsically motivated act to be subjectively smaller and less impactful than 
the identical act when intrinsically motivated. These findings were consistent across 
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different prosocial acts, including donations of money and time (Studies 1-2), and across 
different prosocial domains of humanitarian aid and environmental conservation (Studies 
3-4).  The evaluation of the actor was equally responsive to manipulations of motives and 
of likeability, with manipulated extrinsic motives resulting in lower likeability, and 
manipulations of lower likeability resulting in perceived extrinsic motives (Study 5). 
Likewise, the manipulation of motivation and of liking in separate studies produced 
identical patterns of influence on the evaluation of the act. This finding indicates that 
likeability and perceived motivation are closely and causally associated elements of a 
single construct related to the global evaluation of the actor. Indeed, in studies 1, 3, 4 and 
5, the three liking variables and two motivation variables consistently resulted in high 
scale reliability (alphas ranged from 0.879 to 0.927).  When no motive information is 
given, freely chosen acts result in inferences of intrinsic motivation, with predicted 
favorable evaluations of actor and act, relative to a forced-choice act (Study 6).  The 
effect of motivation on evaluative judgment can be reduced or eliminated when the 
magnitude of the prosocial act becomes large enough (Study 7). When faced with a 
choice of product offered by an intrinsic or extrinsic actor (Study 8), and of resource 
allocation between an intrinsic or extrinsic actor (Study 9), people consistently altered 
their choice behavior from baseline in response to motivation information, tending to 
favor the intrinsically motivated actor over the extrinsically motivated actor even though 
this choice meant selecting a less desirable product and a suboptimal donation allocation.  
Of the seven studies that examined the effect of motivation on evaluative 
judgment, there were a number of similarities from one study to the next, and there were 
some differences of note (See Table 6.1). The Mturk samples tended to be older than 
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student samples, as expected, with average ages in the early thirties compared to average 
student subject pool ages in the late teens to very early twenties. The Mturk participants 
tended to be a majority female, but similar to the female composition of student samples. 
Across all of the studies, the effect of motivation on evaluation of the actor tended to be 
larger than the effect of motivation on evaluation of the act.  Where planned contrasts 
were performed, the effect size for the extrinsic condition vs. intrinsic and control tended 
to be larger than the effect size for intrinsic vs. control, as we predicted, based on the 
negativity bias and evidence from overjustification research. Finally, the effect of 
extrinsic motivation vs. other motivations is very stable across prosocial domains and 
subject populations.  
We contend that people respond to motivation information by forming an 
impression of the person that not only corresponds to the motivation, but also 
incorporates perceived motivation into the global evaluation of the actor. We believe that 
the perception of associations between motivation and likeability are part of a relatively 
basic pattern of associations. Both developmental evidence and evolutionary evidence 
suggest that inferences about others’ intentions and desires are acquired early in human 
development and happen very quickly and automatically (Malle & Holbrook, 2012). We 
Table 6.1 Study Summary
Study # Domain Act Sample N Avg Age
% 
Female
Act Eval        
(EvsIC or EvsI) 
Cohen's d
Act Eval      
(IvsC)       
Cohen's d
Actor Eval 
(EvsIC or EvsI) 
Cohen's d
Actor Eval 
(IvsC)   
Cohen's d
1 Humanitarian $ Donation MTurk 95 33 55 0.51 0.45 1.45 0.72
2 Humanitarian Time Student 100 * 67 0.78 ** 2.31 **
3 Environmental $ Donation MTurk 96 31 54 0.90 0.23 1.21 0.02
4 Environmental Product 
Purchase
MTurk 57 30 68 0.63 0.14 2.09 0.03
5 Humanitarian $ Donation Mturk 96 32 52 0.49 0.04 1.51 0.54
6 Humanitarian $ Donation Student 84 * 61 0.45 ** 1.23 **
7 Humanitarian Time Student 123 * 59 0.18 ** 1.00 **
* Age data not collected; student sample expected to be approximately 19 - 20 years on average 
** No control condition, so only extrinsic vs instrinsic comparisons
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have operationalized the motivation conditions to reflect intentional actions that reflect 
specific desires, either intrinsically or extrinsically motivated, and we believe that the 
effects we have identified are of the relatively basic type explored by Malle. We are 
concerned primarily with the lower level associative process, rather than any higher 
order, linear process that may contribute to the effect. Were we to propose a linear 
process as the mechanism for the effect of motivation on evaluation of the act, that would 
suggest that the effect of motivation on the evaluation of the act is mediated by actor 
evaluation. We could conduct such a mediation analysis, and it would return results 
suggesting mediation, however we do not believe this is appropriate, given our model of 
low-level associations. Such an analysis would, we contend, be measuring a construct’s 
mediation of itself. Effectively, we suggest that within the network of associations related 
to evaluation of the actor, we could manipulate any of the components, activate that 
network of associations, and produce the effect on evaluation of the prosocial act.  We 
mention this point now, in the first study, as it holds for all of the studies using this 
design, and underpins the approach that we have taken to analysis in the present research. 
 This evaluation of the actor results in our two key hypotheses: that extrinsically 
motivated actors are evaluated less favorably than are intrinsically or neutrally motivated 
actors, and that the evaluation of the actor then influences evaluation of the prosocial act.  
The present research demonstrates that in this set of correlated evaluative judgments 
result from close associations between motivation and liking, initially, and then between 
the actor and the act.  
One might suggest that, even in the absence of financial fraud, seeking to gain 
personally from a prosocial act through image enhancement or other intangible benefits 
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that do not disadvantage others may still represent some form of wrongdoing, rightfully 
causing the differences in evaluation. The wrongdoing in this case may be as simple as 
being perceived to seek credit for a good act when the actor’s intentions and desires were 
for an outcome that is quite separate from the good outcome. In cases where only good 
outcomes were realized, people refuse to give credit for good outcomes when the actor 
did not intend the outcome (Knobe, 2007). In evaluating an extrinsically motivated actor 
less favorably, people may be demonstrating the Knobe effect, refusing to give credit for 
the good outcome due to the misaligned intentions and desires of the actor. 
 Yet we believe the extrinsically motivated actor is only “bad” relative to the 
intrinsically motivated actor. The extrinsically motivated acts are still beneficial prosocial 
acts from which real benefit accrues to the charitable causes, and the extrinsic 
motivations, though possibly disingenuous, are generally harmless. In fact, making a 
donation to impress a romantic interest or choosing a car that fits in with an aspirational 
social group could be considered to be highly adaptive behaviors that produce outcomes 
that enhance the actor’s happiness and wellbeing.  Therefore the negative valence is 
unlikely to spring from the act itself or even from the ways in which our extrinsically 
motivated actors seek to gain personally from the act. We believe that the negative 
valence attached to extrinsic motivation arises from our evolutionary tendencies to 
identify cheaters on social contracts, and from our negative affective reactions to being 
extrinsically motivated.  
We have previously acknowledged the rationality of attending to motivation in 
situations of bilateral long term interactions, where the theory of indirect reciprocity 
focuses on prediction of future behavior. Cheater detection within indirect reciprocal 
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arrangements generally operates to predict future behavior, and punishment of cheaters is 
used to elicit conforming behavior in future interactions between the parties. (Delton et 
al, 2012; Fehr & Gächter, 2002a). The current research, however, demonstrates that 
people in discrete, rather than long-term, interactions, attend to motivation and adjust 
their judgments and behavior to effectively punish extrinsically motivated actors. These 
adjustments appear to be a form of punishment of extrinsically motivated actors who are 
performing a beneficial act. They are not cheaters in the strict sense, but extrinsic 
motivation seems to arouse negative affective responses (Pretty & Seligman, 1984), and 
attracts treatment from observers that resembles punishment. In particular, the behavior 
changes in Studies 7 and 8 resemble altruistic punishment, in which punishment is costly 
to the punisher and, due to the one-shot nature of the interaction, the punisher can derive 
no future benefit of the punishment. This is consistent with studies by Fehr and Gächter, 
showing participants in one-shot cooperation games consistently engage in altruistic 
punishment. They found that negative emotions towards cheaters were the proximate 
justification for altruistic punishment, with punishers reporting high levels of anger 
toward the cheater (2002a). These findings suggest a retributive motive in applying 
punishment to cheating in a discrete interaction. To the extent that observers consider 
extrinsic motivation for a prosocial act to be akin to cheating, this is a possible 
explanation for the adjustments to choice behaviors demonstrated by participants in 
Studies 8 and 9. 
It has been clearly established that extrinsic motivations are associated with 
negative traits behaviors and expectations, as discussed in Chapter 1. We believe that 
extrinsic motivation itself is a negative construct, based in part on the foregoing 
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discussion of its negative social implications and the negative emotions aroused.  
Motivation is of sufficient relevance and importance to people that they will change their 
behavior in response to perceived motivations, in ways that resemble punishment of the 
extrinsically motivated actor. As demonstrated by Fehr and Gachter, taking a punitive 
action against a social cheater seems to be driven by the negative emotions aroused by 
the apparent cheating. Similarly, Pretty and Seligman have shown that the negative 
affective experience of extrinsic motivation causes people to disengage from an activity. 
Because punishment in a one-shot interaction cannot improve outcomes for the punisher, 
this could easily be characterized as an error – the application of costly punishment 
cannot affect the impact of the donation, cannot influence future behavior of the actor to 
the benefit of the punisher, and so it seems to violate common measures of economic 
rationality. 
There are many examples of people making consistent choices that violate rules 
of rationality and basic economic principles of utility and dominance, among others. (see 
summary in Keys & Schwartz, 2009).  A number of perspectives on rationality are 
incorporating the underlying reasons for these errors into more contextualized models of 
rationality, referring to evolutionary explanations and cognitive and affective 
mechanisms (Keys & Schwartz, 2007; see also Kenrick, 2009 and Fiedler & Wänke, 
2009 for perspectives drawing on bounded and ecological rationality).   Keys & Schwartz 
have introduced the concept of “leaky rationality”, in which contextual information from 
the framing of a choice “leaks” into the experience of the result of the choice, causing the 
experience of the result to be consistent with the experience of the choice. He presents 
people with classic choice problems, including the lost $20 vs. lost theatre ticket (mental 
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accounting, e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Thaler, 1999,), continuing to watch a bad 
movie that you have either paid for or not (sunk costs principle, Frisch, 1993), gambles 
showing violations of dominance (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986), among others, When 
making the choices, people demonstrated the expected effects of differential framing of 
the problems. But when presented with both versions of the choice problem and asked to 
make reflective judgments about the choices, most reported believing that the two 
formulations of the problem were genuinely different and required differential treatment 
(Frisch, 1993).  Her argument was that framing affects decisions because the decision-
maker is anticipating the effect the framing will have on the experience of the result. 
Keys & Schwartz (2009) take this argument further, arguing that the experience at the 
moment of decision and the experienced utility of the result of the decision, which have 
been uncoupled theoretically (see Kahneman 2000), must be reconnected in order to 
understand the rationality of allowing contextual information to influence judgments and 
decisions. 
The existing evidence for intentional incorporation of contextual information into 
decision-making has been situated in the domains such as framing and mental 
accounting. We conducted a pilot study to narrow the focus to the intentionality of use of 
motivation information in evaluative judgment. In the pilot study, participants were asked 
the extent to which they should rely on two different types of information when 
evaluating the prosocial act, with choices of the amount of money donated and the 
reasons the actor made the donation evaluated on a 7 point scale (1 = not at all, and 7 = to 
a very great extent). We found that people felt they should rely equally on size of 
donation and reasons for donation almost equally (M = 4.65 and 4.46, SD = 1.79 and 
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1.49, respectively) This result indicates that people intentionally consider motivation 
information in evaluation of a prosocial act, and appear to feel justified in doing so.  
Drawing on the idea of contextual leakage into the experience of decision results, this 
reliance on motivation information takes on a heightened rationality. Imagine one of the 
participants in Study 8, who chose a bright white light bulb rather than the preferred soft 
white bulb because of the motivations of the offering charities. The choice between bulbs 
is a momentary point in time, but the new efficient light bulb will last for years. Every 
time they turn on that light bulb and notice the harsh light, they will experience the less 
desirable trait anew, but they will likely simultaneously be reminded of the noble 
motivations of the charity, and they will counter the less desirable trait with the ongoing 
experience of the warm glow of good deeds done.   
The current research has focused quite narrowly on the effect of motivation on 
evaluative judgments in relatively discrete applied domains. This narrow focus was 
useful in extending our examination of the effect of motivation incrementally into 
additional domains and types of prosocial acts, but it has limited the contribution of this 
work to a basic understanding of the effect, with some suggestions for future research. 
Specifically, the current work did not measure or manipulate a number of potentially 
interesting individual differences, such as motivational orientation, personal values, 
religiosity and affluence, among others. Some individual difference variables were 
measured (political orientation), but were not significant predictors so we have no 
evidence for individual differences moderating the effects of motives.; these variables 
should likely be further explored in future work. The gender of the protagonist in the 
vignettes was held constant (male) in an effort to vary few dimensions with each new 
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study, however it is likely that responses to a female protagonist would produce different, 
perhaps more polarized results, making protagonist gender an important area for future 
manipulation. 
The particular way in which we manipulated motivation may have been overly 
valenced, in that the extrinsic motivation condition tended to be overtly manipulative, and 
even Machiavellian in the case of the tennis club membership. There are a number of 
ways to frame an extrinsic motivator that is not overtly negatively valenced, such as 
making energy conservation improvements to your home to benefit from a government 
subsidy, or buying a hybrid vehicle primarily for the savings on gas purchase. Self 
determination theory presents extrinsic motivation as a continuum varying on autonomy, 
from intentional actions that are goal seeking and aligned to outcomes just separable from 
the outcome of the act (working in an enjoyable career for the lifestyle it affords), to 
involuntary actions that are compelled by an outside force (prisoners submitting to a 
search). This continuum represents an important dimension along which the boundaries 
of motivation influence can be tested in future work. 
In considering future study design, the paradigm of observer and actor could be 
criticized for being one step removed from the real interests of motivated interactants; 
Study 8 involved participants who were choosing a product for themselves and therefore 
had real interests at play in making the judgments. The remainder of the studies involved 
relatively disinterested observers judging actors. This model, we believe, posed a more 
conservative test of the effect of motivation on judgments, but more directly interested 
parties may be of greater practical interest and more representative of real world 
judgments and decisions for future explorations.  Likewise, seeking to manipulate 
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separately the motivation and likeability of the actor could be helpful in disentangling the 
relationship between these two constructs. We saw them vary closely in the current work, 
but did not attempt to manipulate them as orthogonal constructs.  
So why does the effect of motivation on evaluation of prosocial acts matter in 
practice? We believe there are very concrete implications of this effect for the motivated 
actors, for observers of prosocial activity, and for policy makers.  Extrinsically motivated 
actors may attract unexpected social costs in terms of social perception and evaluation. 
These actors, and their prosocial acts, are likely to be devalued by others, regardless of 
actual beneficial impact on society, if their motives are known or suspected. This is likely 
because extrinsically motivated actors may be perceived to be cheating in seeking to 
accumulate undeserved social capital, even when their act is beneficial. 
Observers may find themselves making choices that favor the intrinsic over 
extrinsic actor, and these choices may appear to violate rationality, but may be rationally 
accounting for future affective responses to the decision result. Making such choices that 
effectively punish or discourage extrinsically motivated prosociality may, in the long run, 
reduce the amount of prosocial action at a societal level, serving the individual in some 
way, but reducing overall wellbeing in society; this choice pattern may therefore be 
something to avoid, potentially with the help of policy makers. 
Policy makers should actively consider the role of motives for the institution and 
the consumer, rather than dismissing such inputs as irrational. They must consider the 
impact of motives on individual choices, programmatic success and societal wellbeing. 
Promotion of institutional or institutional extrinsic motivators for a prosocial program is 
likely to result in lower participation rates among consumers, and thus reduce overall 
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social benefits of policies in areas such as energy conservation. The use of intrinsic 
motivators to nudge behaviors toward greater overall wellbeing should be actively 
incorporated.  
We contend that these considerations are of vital importance to practitioners, 
program designers and policy makers because people’s use of motivation in judgment 
appears to be intentional, they are unlikely to correct their judgments based on arguments 
of rationality, and they use it to shape their consumer choice behavior. It matters not that 
by standards of traditional rationality, they shouldn’t. The real folly is unlikely to lie in 
the “flawed judgment” of the consumer evaluating the prosocial act, and deciding to 
donate to the next big earthquake appeal or to opt in to the new renewable energy plan. It 
lies, more likely, with the energy policy maker, the humanitarian charity fundraiser, and 
the public utility implementing a voluntary consumer energy efficiency program in 
assuming that perceived motivation does not matter because it should not matter.  We 
hasten to point out that our purpose in this proposal is not to suggest that formal rules of 
rationality are without value. Essential rules provide clarity and structure to a body of 
knowledge, and serve as instructive prescriptive rules that can support aspirations toward 
rational action, rather than as normative rules that define rationality (Baron, 1986). 
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